Sait v The General Medical Council (GMC) [2018] EWHC 3160 (Admin)

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Sait v The General Medical Council (GMC) [2018] EWHC 3160 (Admin) concerned an appeal by Dr Mohammed Suhaib Sait, a consultant orthopaedic surgeon of unblemished reputation over more than three decades, against findings by the Medical Practitioners Tribunal that he had engaged in sexually motivated misconduct, that his fitness to practise was impaired, and that he should be suspended for three months.

Mr Sait was tried on allegations concerning two patients. Most allegations relating to Patient A were found unproved or, where admitted or proved, not sexually motivated. The appeal concerned findings in respect of Patient B. The Tribunal found proved that between September 2014 and May 2016 Mr Sait had on one or more occasion(s) during consultations told Patient B that she was “pretty” (or words to that effect); that on 9 May 2016 he telephoned Patient B and asked her to meet him at a public house; that at the meeting he told her she was “very pretty”, suggested she consider divorcing her husband, told her not to tell her husband of the meeting, said his wife did not know they were meeting and that he often met patients outside work without telling his wife; and that he asked her to go with him to his car. The Tribunal found all these actions were sexually motivated. Allegations that he had suggested telephoning her on 18 April 2016 to discuss marital problems, and that he had hugged and kissed her at the pub, were found not proved. Mr Sait did not appeal the primary factual findings, but challenged the finding of sexual motivation and, consequently, the finding of impairment.

Patient B’s written statement described discussing her marital difficulties with Mr Sait at consultations and feeling uncomfortable when he called her pretty during medical appointments but initially putting it down to friendliness. She said that after the meeting on 9 May 2016, which she understood Mr Sait had instigated by telephone, he had driven away and they had no contact thereafter. Mr Sait in his witness statement said Patient B had left an urgent message with his secretary requesting a meeting (though no corroborating statement from the secretary was produced), that he had been shocked by the personal nature of her concerns and made clear he could not give professional or legal advice, and denied all inappropriate or sexual content. He said they shook hands and parted in the car park. The Tribunal accepted Patient B’s account on the contested points.

On the earlier consultations allegation, Patient B in cross‑examination expanded on her written evidence, stating that when Mr Sait told her during scans that her bones and skin were fine and she was pretty or attractive, she thought “this is about my medical care” and felt uncomfortable. Counsel did not explore this answer further and did not directly challenge her that what she said was untrue. Mr Sait was asked no questions at all about the “pretty” allegation in cross‑examination beyond two perfunctory questions at the end of his evidence: whether it crossed his mind that Patient B was pretty (he said no) and whether his actions were sexually motivated (he said “not at all; entirely professional”). Notwithstanding this evidential deficit, the Tribunal found the allegation proved, stating that Patient B had been credible and consistent. Mr Sait did not appeal that factual finding.

The legal assessor advised the Tribunal that there was no particular legal definition of sexually motivated behaviour and that it should be defined using common sense and ordinary language, citing language derived from section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 concerning when conduct is “sexual”. Both counsel acknowledged this advice was impenetrably dense and sought to simplify it to focus on the individual’s state of mind, though counsel for Mr Sait rightly criticised any suggestion that determining the individual’s purpose might not be necessary.

The Tribunal found that Mr Sait’s conduct was sexually motivated by considering the facts in their totality. It determined there was a reasonable inference of a “pattern” of behaviour based on Mr Sait’s denials in the face of matters found proved, the nature of the invitation made on 9 May 2016, Patient B’s account and vulnerability, the lack of explanation for a meeting outside a clinical setting for reasons unconnected to his professional role, the repeated references to Patient B’s appearance, the suggestion that she consider divorce, the suggestion she withhold information about the meeting from her husband, the assertion that his wife did not know of the meeting and that he often met patients outside work, and the invitation to go to his car. The Tribunal concluded that it could reasonably be inferred that Mr Sait intended to progress his relationship with Patient B with a view to sexual relations. The Tribunal noted his previous good character but gave it less weight in light of the factual findings and his decision to meet a recent patient at a pub. The Tribunal also found that Mr Sait’s only recollection of the conversation at the pub was that it had been professional at all times, but he was unable to recall the content.

Mr Justice Mostyn noted that these findings applied to both the earlier consultations and the events of 9 May 2016, yet the matters relied upon were virtually entirely concerned with the latter. The reasoning said almost nothing about why calling Patient B “pretty” during consultations was sexually motivated. The finding about the earlier events was highly significant because it constituted the principal plank in the reasoning that there was a “pattern” of sexually motivated misconduct. The judge also observed that the Tribunal had found it not proved that Mr Sait suggested on 18 April 2016 that he could telephone Patient B to discuss marital problems, and that Patient B had gathered a dossier of emails in the mere 15 minutes after the telephone call on 9 May 2016, yet the Tribunal found that Mr Sait had made the initial approach. The absence of corroboration from Mr Sait’s secretary was likely influential, and Mr Sait did not appeal that factual finding. In relation to Patient A, the Tribunal had found that Mr Sait calling Patient A and her mother “pretty” in a hospital setting in the presence of Patient A’s partner was not sexually motivated but a clumsy attempt at conversation, yet did not explain why the same phrase used with Patient B was treated differently.

Mr Sait advanced four grounds of appeal. First, the Tribunal failed to observe essential standards of procedural fairness in that it was never sufficiently put to him in cross‑examination or by the Tribunal’s own questions that he had conducted himself as alleged because he intended to progress his relationship with Patient B with a view to sexual relations. Second, in finding that he intended to progress the relationship with a view to sexual relations, the Tribunal failed to confine itself to the specific allegation that the impugned conduct was itself sexually motivated. Third, the Tribunal’s findings were not supported by the evidence, in particular there was no evidential basis for a pattern of sexually motivated behaviour, and the Tribunal failed to carry out any sufficient assessment of Mr Sait’s subjective state of mind. Fourth, the finding at paragraph 109 that Mr Sait was unable to recall the content of the conversation was contrary to the evidence.

Mr Justice Mostyn referred to his earlier decision in Basson v GMC [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin) concerning the standard of review for factual findings derived from inference or deduction. He accepted that in a regulatory appeal such a challenge is less stringent than a challenge to a concrete finding of fact, though generally a finding can only be challenged where it is wholly contrary to the weight of the evidence or there was some fault in the decision‑making process rendering it unsafe. He added two elementary axioms: where a professional is accused of serious misconduct the allegation must be fully particularised, and save in rare cases the accusations should be put squarely in cross‑examination.

The judge rejected ground two, holding that although the standard allegation that actions were “sexually motivated” should in future specify whether sexual gratification or grooming (pursuing a future sexual relationship) is alleged, it must have been obvious from the pleaded facts that this was a case of both types, and the GMC was never asked to break down the generalised allegation. Ground four was also rejected. Whilst the phrasing of paragraph 109 was unfortunate in suggesting only one contemporary recollection when Mr Sait had in fact recalled the gist of the conversation, this was likely poor drafting rather than a fundamental defect and did not impact the main findings.

On ground one, the judge considered that the merit of the ground was not about the sort of forensic ambush exemplified by the rule in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67, which he regarded as now obsolete given modern civil procedure requiring all cards to be put face up on the table. The rule originally concerned fairness where a witness is not given an opportunity in cross‑examination to explain matters on which his credit is later impeached. However, with modern systems of pleadings, witness statements and skeleton arguments, notice of impeachment is given. The judge referred to the Privy Council decision in Chen v Ng [2017] UKPC 27, which concerned procedural unfairness where grounds for disbelief were not put to the witness, and to Carr J in Williams v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2017] EWHC 1478 (Admin), where it was held that in a serious dishonesty case the solicitor should have been challenged directly so his evidence could be tested properly before a finding could be made. The judge did not read those cases to suggest cross‑examination is unnecessary where an allegation is simple or single‑issue; rather, if an allegation is serious (and sexually motivated misconduct against a doctor is about as serious as it gets), it must be fully and squarely put in cross‑examination. Cross‑examination enables the tribunal to assess not only the content of replies but also demeanour, which is the best method for sifting out the truth, as expressed by Sir Matthew Hale, Sir William Blackstone and the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.

The judge held there was a remarkable failure to cross‑examine Mr Sait about his alleged sexual motivation beyond two perfunctory questions at the very end. Counsel for the GMC argued that fuller cross‑examination would have been pointless given Mr Sait’s denial of the primary facts, but Mr Justice Mostyn disagreed. The case of sexual motivation should have been put very clearly and Mr Sait should have been given a much fuller opportunity to respond. Better that cross‑examination should be unduly long than unfairly short or non‑existent. The failure to cross‑examine comprehensively on the central allegation was procedurally unfair to such a degree that the appeal must be allowed on that ground.

On ground three, the judge held that a central plank of the finding was that Mr Sait had engaged in a “pattern” of sexually motivated behaviour, which required examining the earlier consultations where he called Patient B “pretty”. The Tribunal had found that calling Patient A “pretty” in hospital in the presence of her partner was not sexually motivated but a clumsy attempt at conversation, yet did not explain why the same phrase used with Patient B was treated differently. Patient B’s written evidence assumed Mr Sait “was just being friendly to put me at ease”. The judge held there was virtually no evidential foundation and no clear or sufficient reasoning for the finding that in calling Patient B “pretty” at consultations there was sexual motivation. Even now Mr Sait did not know how many times or in what context he was said to have uttered the word with sexual motivation. Recognising it is rare for a finding of fact to be set aside, the judge was satisfied this finding was clearly wrong and must be set aside. He referred to Arunkalaivanan v General Medical Council [2014] EWHC 873 (Admin), emphasising the need for proper scrutiny of all evidence to determine whether sexual motivation can be inferred, and to Re H & Ors (minors) [1995] UKHL 16 concerning the need for evidential clarity where allegations are serious. Having set aside the earlier sexual motivation finding, there was no “pattern” of sexually motivated actions, which fatally undermined the reasoning concerning Mr Sait’s state of mind on 9 May 2016. Ground three therefore succeeded.

Mr Justice Mostyn set aside the findings in relation to Patient B and the consequential finding of impairment of fitness to practise by virtue of misconduct, and directed that the allegations in respect of Patient B should be retried. The decision was largely based on procedural unfairness, and the judge was not in a position to determine for himself what the result would have been had the process been procedurally fair.

In short, the appeal was allowed, the findings of sexually motivated misconduct and impairment were set aside, and the matter was remitted for rehearing on the basis that Mr Sait had been denied a fair opportunity to meet the central allegation in cross‑examination and that key findings lacked an evidential foundation or adequate reasoning.

Basson v General Medical Council [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin)
Williams v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2017] EWHC 1478
Chen v Ng [2017] UKPC 27
Carmarthenshire County Council v Y [2017] EWFC 36

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