Sait v The General Medical Council [2019] EWHC 3279 (Admin)
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Sait v The General Medical Council [2019] EWHC 3279 (Admin) concerned Dr Mohammed Suhaib Sait’s second appeal against a finding by the Medical Practitioners Tribunal on 21 May 2019 that his conduct on 9 May 2016 had been sexually motivated. The appeal was dismissed by Mr Justice Mostyn.
The appellant, a registered medical practitioner, had previously appealed to the High Court in 2018. In that first appeal Mr Justice Mostyn had allowed the appeal to a limited extent, setting aside the finding that certain conduct toward Patient B had been sexually motivated and directing a retrial of that issue only. The conduct in question comprised: telling Patient B during consultations between September 2014 and May 2016 that she was pretty or words to that effect; telephoning her on 9 May 2016 and asking her to meet him at a public house; telling her at the meeting that she was very pretty, that she should consider divorcing her husband, and that she should not tell her husband about the meeting; and asking her at the end of the meeting to accompany him to his car. The first Tribunal’s finding that the appellant had instigated the meeting had not been appealed and accordingly remained binding.
At the retrial the second Tribunal heard oral evidence, including cross-examination of the appellant by Ms Chloe Fairley. The second Tribunal acquitted the appellant of sexual motivation in relation to his use of the word “pretty” during consultations and to his invitation to Patient B to go to his car, but found that his act of telephoning her to arrange the meeting and his conduct during the meeting itself had been sexually motivated. It went on to find misconduct, impairment of fitness to practise, and imposed a sanction of two months’ suspension. The appellant did not challenge the sanction as such but appealed the finding of sexual motivation on four grounds: failure to consider matters central to his defence; introduction of factors not foreshadowed in the allegations; reliance on evidentially irrelevant considerations; and wholly speculative fact-finding.
Mr Justice Mostyn began by clarifying the applicable legal principles. He referred to his earlier decision in Basson v GMC [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin), in which he had defined sexual motivation as conduct done either in pursuit of sexual gratification or in pursuit of a future sexual relationship. The present case concerned the second limb. He emphasised that Tribunals must be careful not to equate inappropriate conduct with sexually motivated conduct and must address whether there could be any other explanation for the behaviour. He noted that the state of a person’s mind is proved by inference or deduction from surrounding evidence and that an appellate challenge to such an evaluative finding, where credibility assessment is central, attracts a high degree of caution. Relying on the judgment of Lord Hodge in Beacon Insurance Company Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd [2014] UKPC 21, Mr Justice Mostyn held that where the evaluation of facts leading to a finding of sexual motivation was heavily influenced by a credibility assessment, the case lay much closer to the end of the spectrum where appellate intervention is most difficult. The appeal should succeed only if the finding was wholly contrary to the weight of the evidence or some fault in the decision-making process rendered the finding unsafe.
Mr Justice Mostyn also addressed the appellant’s criticisms of the adequacy of the Tribunal’s written reasons, citing the principles in English v Emery Reimbold [2002] 1 WLR 2409 and the recent exposition by Sir James Munby P in Re F (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 546. A Tribunal is under no obligation to record every point in favour of the doctor. Its task is to enable the parties to understand the outcome and to provide sufficient detail for an appellate court to assess sustainability. The court must avoid narrow textual analysis and resist the temptation to strive by mental gymnastics to find error where none exists.
The Tribunal’s essential findings included that the appellant’s use of the personal remark “pretty” to Patient B was out of character and breached professional boundaries; that it rejected his assertion that he had agreed to meet Patient B because of an anxious tone in her voice; that Patient B had only recently been discharged; that the appellant telephoned her to meet in a non-clinical setting; that he did not tell his colleagues or secretary; that he drove directly to the public house; that he knew the meeting was of a personal nature; and that he remained to have lunch and discuss matters once it became clear Patient B wanted to discuss her matrimonial difficulties. Crucially, the Tribunal found at paragraph 16 that the appellant’s evidence during the proceedings was not credible, appeared inconsistent, introduced new points never previously raised, and gave the impression of being rehearsed and practised. His explanation that he had met Patient B because of an anxious tone in her voice was found particularly unpersuasive. On the basis of these findings, the Tribunal concluded at paragraph 35 that on the balance of probabilities the appellant had conducted himself in the hope of having a future sexual relationship with Patient B, that he had been testing the waters, and that he had not contacted her afterwards because she was not interested.
Mr Justice Mostyn turned to the four grounds of appeal. As to the first ground, the appellant advanced seven instances in which the Tribunal was said to have failed to consider matters central to his defence. Mr Justice Mostyn rejected each instance. Patient B’s evidence that she had raised marital problems in clinic was in fact referred to in the findings at paragraphs 18 and 19. The appellant’s evidence that he had called Patient B in response to her call to his secretary was recorded at paragraph 28, though in any event the appellant was estopped from challenging the first Tribunal’s finding that he had instigated the meeting. The omission of Dr Thilagarajah’s written evidence about the choice of venue was inconsequential. References to Patient B’s dossier of telephone printouts and to the phrases “if she was finding her problems too much to bear” and “that she would have no problem finding someone else” were either present in the reasons or rightly regarded by the Tribunal as throwing no light on the central question. The appellant’s evidence that he had told Patient B to seek help elsewhere was recorded at paragraph 29. The Tribunal had expressly stated that it had regard to all the documentary and oral evidence.
The second and third grounds, taken together, alleged the introduction of unpleaded factors and reliance on evidentially irrelevant considerations. The appellant complained that the Tribunal had taken into account that he had not told colleagues or his secretary, that he drove directly to the public house, and that he remained for lunch, all of which matters were said to be unpleaded. Mr Justice Mostyn held that the anti-ambush principle does not require every aspect of surrounding contextual evidence to be foreshadowed in the charges or written evidence. All the matters in question were put to the appellant in oral evidence and he was given a fair opportunity to deal with them. No adjournment was sought and the Tribunal discerned no unfairness. The appellant also relied on remarks made by the Chair during oral evidence concerning a cultural assumption about a man paying for a meal where he hoped for a future sexual relationship. Mr Justice Mostyn held that remarks made during evidence cannot, except in very extreme cases, found a basis for impugning a judgment. This was no more than the Chair thinking out loud and did not find its way into the reasons.
The fourth ground alleged wholly speculative fact-finding, namely the Tribunal’s conclusion that the reason for no follow-up contact was that Patient B was not interested in a future sexual relationship. The appellant said this was unsupported by Patient B’s evidence and calculated to neutralise exculpatory evidence. Mr Justice Mostyn rejected this criticism, holding that the Tribunal was entitled on the evidence to form the view that there was no follow-up because Patient B was not interested and that this was a legitimate finding, albeit of limited weight.
Mr Justice Mostyn concluded that the attacks on the Tribunal’s reasoning were a classic example of the syndrome described by Sir James Munby P: an attempt to engage in narrow textual analysis to demonstrate error when in truth there was none, dwelling on semantics rather than substance. The overwhelming problem facing the appellant was that the Tribunal simply did not believe him. It had made a very clear credibility finding which underpinned its factual findings and ultimate evaluation. The findings could not be said to be wholly contrary to the weight of the evidence. The reasons were impeccably formulated and expressed and there was no basis to impugn them. For all these reasons the appeal was dismissed.
In short, the appeal against the finding of sexually motivated conduct was dismissed, the court holding that the Tribunal’s adverse credibility assessment was entitled to great deference and its reasons were sound.
Sait v The General Medical Council (GMC) [2018] EWHC 3160 (Admin)
Basson v General Medical Council [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin)
Arunkalaivanan v General Medical Council [2014] EWHC 873
General Medical Council v Jagjivan [2017] EWHC 1247 (Admin), [2017] 1 WLR 4438
Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Serv ice Ltd [2007] UKHL 23; [2007] 1 WLR 1325
Beacon Insurance Co Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd [2014] UKPC 21; [2014] 4 All ER 418
Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360
Biogen Inc. v Medeva [1997] RPC 1
Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246
Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884
English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409, [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 3 All ER 385
Phipps v General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 397
SP v EB and KP [2014] EWHC 3964
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 1642
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group [2003] 1 WLR 577
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