York [2018] EWCA Crim 2754

**Regina v York** [2018] EWCA Crim 2754 concerned an appeal against a compensation order imposed by the Crown Court at Plymouth for an offence of being in charge of a dog which caused injury while dangerously out of control in a public place. The Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Hickinbottom, Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing DBE and Mr Justice William Davis) quashed the compensation order.

Miss York pleaded guilty on 12 July 2018. His Honour Judge Timothy Rose imposed a community order with 150 hours’ unpaid work and ordered her to pay £1,000 compensation to the injured party, Ms Jayne Taylor.

The dog, Molly, was a 14-month-old Rottweiler owned by Miss York’s daughter Corinne, who had learning difficulties and was profoundly deaf. In September 2017 Molly had bitten an RSPCA inspector in an unprovoked attack. The inspector advised that the dog should be spayed to calm her and should wear a muzzle when in public. Molly was taken to the vet to be spayed and given stitches. On 24 October 2017 Molly needed to return to have the stitches removed. Because Corinne had a chemotherapy appointment that morning, Miss York agreed to take the dog to the vet. She was running late and under stress. She had tightened the dog’s clip-fastened collar the night before but did not check it again that morning. She did not have the dog’s harness or headpiece but had the muzzle. She parked close to the vet surgery and decided not to use the muzzle for the short walk. When she opened the car, the dog slipped its collar and ran off. Molly ran up to Ms Taylor, jumped up at her and bit her through her anorak. The dog then bit her buttock. Miss York chased the dog calling its name but it did not respond. She had apparently not realised how serious the incident was, thinking the dog was simply greeting the stranger by jumping up.

Ms Taylor’s arm was bitten down to the bone and may have been broken, although there was some doubt about this. She required eight stitches to her arm, which were not inserted too tightly in case infection developed. There was a victim personal statement before the judge. Miss York was of previous good character. A stand-down pre-sentence report revealed that she lived in a mortgaged property of 15 years, worked casually in a kitchen at Plymouth Sea Centre earning approximately £110 per month on the minimum wage, received no benefits and suffered from a number of physical health problems and depression. Her elder daughter was at work and supported her but did not live with her. Corinne had behavioural difficulties that had never been formally diagnosed, had cancer and was attending hospital for radiotherapy, which had caused burns on her body. Miss York was helping Corinne with these appointments. Corinne received some care from the local authority but was not in supported living, placing pressure on Miss York. Both Miss York and her other daughter had advised against getting the Rottweiler and urged training, but Corinne could be difficult.

The probation officer informed the judge that Ms Taylor’s quantifiable losses were £280, comprising three days off work at £85.65 per day, hospital parking and damage to her coat. The judge acknowledged he could not do justice to personal injury compensation in the Crown Court. Prosecuting counsel referred to Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme levels for such injuries. The probation officer told the judge that Miss York had no major debts but her outgoings exceeded her income, though with her daughter’s help “they do just about cope with their bills”. She had “very little disposable income” and would need time to pay. Mr Lewin told the court that Miss York could find £5 per week but this would come from her elder daughter as she could not pay herself. She accepted responsibility and wished to make amends.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge found it difficult to place the offence in any particular guideline box. Taking account of mitigation and the guilty plea, he imposed the community order having ruled out 250 hours. On compensation, which he described as “intensely problematic”, he understood Miss York was “not in an easy position” and that any order might “end up with somebody else stepping in to help you out to some extent”. This put him in “a difficult judgment area in terms of what to do for the best”. He considered Ms Taylor should receive about £2,000 and might receive much more in civil proceedings. Attempting to balance the need for compensation against Miss York’s circumstances, he concluded she should pay £1,000 to reflect the complainant’s economic loss and something towards her injuries. A collection order was made and the judge expressly left the payment regime to the magistrates’ court. He observed the compensation was “at the limit of [the appellant’s] means to pay”, reduced the victim surcharge to zero and made no costs order, having given priority to compensation.

The appeal contended that the compensation order was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal held that six principles were relevant. First, an offender must give details of her means. Second, before making a compensation order a judge must enquire about and make clear findings about the offender’s means. Third, the court must take into account the offender’s means. Fourth, a compensation order should not be made unless it is realistic, meaning the court is satisfied the offender has or will have the means to pay within a reasonable time. Although a 100-month repayment period had been upheld, periods of two or three years in exceptional cases would not be open to criticism but excessively long periods should generally be avoided. Fifth, a court should not make a compensation order against an offender without means on the assumption it will be paid by somebody else such as a relative. Sixth, it is wrong to fix a compensation amount without regard to the instalments the offender is capable of paying and the period over which they should be paid, leaving those questions for the magistrates to resolve.

The court concluded that the judge had not observed these principles. He appeared to have acknowledged both that Miss York did not have the means to pay and that it was likely her elder daughter would in reality be making the payments rather than Miss York herself. In all the circumstances, the compensation order was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive. The court therefore quashed it.

In short, the compensation order of £1,000 was quashed because it was made without proper regard to Miss York’s means and on the apparent assumption that her daughter would pay it.

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