Samuel Crutchley [2019] EWCA Crim 1726

Samuel David Crutchley [2019] EWCA Crim 1726 was an appeal against sentence in the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Males, Mrs Justice Cutts DBE and His Honour Judge Dean QC sitting) which was dismissed.

On 11 February 2019 in the Crown Court at Derby Mr Crutchley pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. On 20 February 2019 he was sentenced to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. He was disqualified from driving for 117 months pursuant to section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, comprising 72 months’ disqualification with an extension period of 45 months. An extended retest was ordered. He appealed the custodial term with the leave of the single judge.

On 26 January 2018 Mr Crutchley and a group of friends including the deceased, Mr Joshua Brown, went out in Staffordshire. Mr Crutchley drove them to the Roebuck Public House in Draycott, where they remained for over two hours and Mr Crutchley consumed about three pints of Stella Artois lager. Leaving the car in the car park, the group moved to a nightclub in Uttoxeter, remaining until approximately three o’clock in the morning. Mr Crutchley continued to consume alcohol. They were given a lift back to the location of the car. CCTV footage suggested all were affected by alcohol. The footage showed the boot of the car open for some time. The car had a slow puncture to the rear nearside tyre which was known to Mr Crutchley, as he carried a tyre inflation compressor pump in the car. Subsequent examination revealed wear showing he had previously driven with the tyre deflated. The footage appeared to show the pump being used to try to inflate the tyre. All five persons got into the car. Mr Brown sat in the middle of the rear seat but did not wear his seat belt. The footage appeared to show Mr Crutchley drove away slowly at first. All in the car were jovial. Mr Crutchley was described by one occupant as messing around, making the car jump and splutter in pretence that it was running out of petrol. Someone suggested Mr Crutchley avoid the main roads as he had been drinking.

The chosen route was along Aston Lane in Sudbury, a single-track country lane governed by a 60 mph speed limit. The road surface was damp and it was dark. By the time he reached this road Mr Crutchley had stopped pretending and began accelerating at some speed along Aston Lane, estimated by the collision investigator to be between 63 and 77 mph. He drove 2.35 miles from the Roebuck car park, whereupon he came to a short shallow bend. At this point his vehicle was travelling at approximately 70 mph. Mr Crutchley lost control of the car. It travelled off the road surface to the nearside hedgerow before rolling on to its side and back on to the road, coming to rest on the driver’s side. Mr Brown was ejected from the rear window and was lying unconscious on the ground. The group sought to administer first aid before the ambulance arrived, but he had sustained fatal injuries. He was pronounced dead at the scene. The remaining occupants suffered only minor injuries.

Mr Crutchley was found to be twice over the legal limit for alcohol. A back calculation showed him most likely to have had at the time of the incident 159 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. A blood sample also revealed he had taken cocaine. He was found to have 707 micrograms of metabolised cocaine per litre of blood; the legal limit is 50 micrograms. This placed him more than fourteen times over the legal limit for the Class A drug whilst driving. The collision investigator referred to statistics indicating that a person was eleven times more likely to die in a crash when driving with that level of intoxication than would otherwise be the case. The car was also examined. The rear nearside tyre was found to have been severely deflated at 14 PSI (the appropriate pressure would have been 42 PSI) and the rear offside tyre also had tread below the legal limit. In the view of the collision investigator, Mr Brown’s death was caused by Mr Crutchley driving a motor vehicle with a grossly defective tyre, whilst intoxicated, at a speed in excess of 60 mph at night on a damp single-track country lane.

Mr Crutchley denied in his police interview that he had driven dangerously. He accepted he had been drinking alcohol but denied he had taken cocaine. At the magistrates’ court he indicated a not guilty plea before pleading guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing. He was represented at the magistrates’ court by the duty solicitor, who was in possession of the papers including the collision investigator’s report.

In moving statements, Mr Brown’s family set out the devastating impact of his loss upon them. It was plain they had lost a much-loved grandson, son and brother who should have had his whole life in front of him. Mr Crutchley was aged 27 years at the time of his sentence. He was of good character at the time of the offence but not at the time of sentence. On 14 January 2019 he was sentenced to a community order for an offence of driving a motor vehicle with the proportion of a specified controlled drug above the specified limit, contrary to section 5A(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. No separate penalty was imposed for driving without insurance. This offence had taken place on 3 November 2018 when Mr Crutchley was under investigation for the present offence. The drug in question was again cocaine, with the level at 800 micrograms in 100 millilitres of blood, higher than in the fatal collision.

In mitigation, Mr Crutchley relied on his lack of convictions at the time of the offence, the fact he had a young child, his remorse, the assistance he gave at the scene and the fact that Mr Brown had not been wearing a seat belt at the time of the collision. In his sentencing remarks the judge accepted the prosecution’s contention that this case fell within level 1 of the relevant Sentencing Council guideline. This was principally because, on the blood toxicology analysis, he found it to be a common-sense and logical inference that Mr Crutchley’s driving would have been grossly impaired by his consumption of Class A drugs and alcohol. In addition, he found a number of determinants of seriousness which in isolation would place the offence in level 2. These he identified as the seriously culpable behaviour of driving the vehicle with defective tyres and driving the car at an inappropriate speed above the speed limit on a damp and dark road. Although he recognised this was not a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving, he found Mr Crutchley to have been aware of the risks of driving whilst under the influence of alcohol and with defective tyres, shown by his decision to avoid the main roads lest he be apprehended by the police. The judge found the subsequent offence of driving with excess drugs to be an aggravating feature, noting it was committed close to the anniversary of Mr Brown’s death and showed his approach to driving following a fatal accident. The judge expressly took into account the mitigation: principally Mr Crutchley’s assistance to Mr Brown at the scene, his young child, his good character prior to the offence and his guilty plea which he found indicative of remorse. The judge reached a starting point of ten years’ imprisonment following a trial. He then applied 25 per cent credit to reflect the guilty plea, reaching the total sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment.

Mr Crutchley submitted that the length of his sentence was manifestly excessive. He submitted that the judge misapplied the guideline by impermissibly concluding that he was grossly impaired at the time of the driving, by concluding that the group of determinants were sufficient by themselves to take the matter out of level 2, and, if the offence was properly placed in level 1, by double counting the features used to place it there in aggravating the sentence and thereby increasing the starting point. It was further submitted that the judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the mitigating factors and gave insufficient credit for the guilty plea.

Mrs Justice Cutts, giving the judgment of the court, considered the last point wholly unarguable. Mr Crutchley was represented at the magistrates’ court when he gave an indication of a not guilty plea. Whilst that was by the duty solicitor, that representative had the papers in the case, including the collision investigator’s report. Had he felt unable to properly advise Mr Crutchley on plea at that stage he could have asked for an adjournment or further time but did not. The court could only conclude that he felt there was no need to do so. Mr Crutchley therefore entered his guilty plea at the plea and trial preparation hearing. The court saw no reason to depart from the Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea guideline, which states that full credit is generally reserved for notification of a guilty plea at the first hearing, in this case at the magistrates’ court. Appropriate credit was, in the court’s judgment, given by the judge. The court was similarly unpersuaded that the judge erred in finding Mr Crutchley to have been grossly impaired at the time of his driving by reason of his consumption of alcohol and cocaine. Mr Crutchley’s blood alcohol was not only twice the legal limit, he also had over fourteen times the legal limit of cocaine in his blood. This together with Mr Crutchley’s loss of control of his vehicle leading to the collision entirely justified the judge in concluding that this was an accident which was in large part the result of gross impairment due to the consumption of alcohol and drugs. This, in combination with the decision to avoid the main roads and the police, was sufficient for the judge to properly conclude that Mr Crutchley’s driving involved a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and an apparent disregard for the great danger being caused to others and entitled him to place the offence within level 1 of the guideline.

The guideline requested the judge in reaching the appropriate sentence to consider the determinants of seriousness. This he did, correctly identifying the inappropriate speed of the vehicle and seriously culpable behaviour of driving a poorly maintained vehicle. These factors justified an increase of the starting point. As was plain from a discussion with prosecution counsel during the opening of the facts, the judge was alive to the need to avoid double counting in reaching his sentence. The court found no evidence that he fell into such error. The judge correctly identified the later offence of driving under the influence of drugs as a further aggravating factor. Mr Crutchley was of good character at the time of the fatal accident but seemed to have learned little from it. His suggested remorse had to be seen in light of the fact that, notwithstanding his dangerous driving whilst under the influence of alcohol and drugs had resulted in the death of another, he was prepared to drive once again whilst significantly intoxicated with cocaine. The judge took account of the mitigation available to Mr Crutchley in reaching the custodial term. In driving with a flagrant disregard of the rules of the road such as this, resulting in another’s death, they could carry only limited weight.

In short, the court concluded this was a bad case of causing death by dangerous driving and the judge was entirely justified in concluding that this was a case of great seriousness requiring a substantial sentence after trial; the sentence passed was not manifestly excessive but was just and proportionate, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.