Ryandeep Singh Sidhu & Others [2019] EWCA Crim 1034; [2019] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 34
- Summary
- Citing
- Cited By
Ryandeep Singh Sidhu, Declan Kemp-Francis and Tyrone Andrew appeared before the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Green, Mr Justice Stuart-Smith and HHJ Paul Thomas QC) following their convictions at Birmingham Crown Court on 1 August 2018. The single judge granted permission to appeal sentence to Mr Sidhu and Mr Kemp-Francis in respect of their convictions for perverting the course of justice, for which each had been sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment. Mr Andrew, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment, renewed his application for permission to appeal sentence after the single judge refused it.
The offences arose from events following a boxing match at Walsall town hall on 14 October 2017. Mr Andrew, Mr Kemp-Francis and Mr Sidhu had attended to support the winning fighter, Myron Mills. Rival supporters became hostile and disorder broke out. Mr Andrew was attacked by a group including Philip Smith and Lee Hickinbottom, during which he stabbed Mr Smith. As Mr Andrew got to his feet he retrieved a knife from the ground. CCTV showed that over the following 20 seconds Mr Andrew stabbed Mr Hickinbottom and then the victim, Reagan Asbury, in the neck. Mr Andrew ran up from five to ten metres behind Mr Asbury, who was facing away, and slashed his throat. Mr Kemp-Francis was standing directly in front of Mr Asbury at the time. The wound severed the carotid artery and cut almost through the jugular vein. Mr Asbury died in hospital the following day. Shortly after the attack Mr Andrew handed the knife to Mr Sidhu near the latter’s BMW. Mr Kemp-Francis drove Mr Andrew to Derby, where Mr Andrew changed clothes and took a taxi to Birmingham Airport. He flew to Amsterdam and then to Barcelona, where he was arrested in December 2017 and extradited in January 2018.
Mr Andrew’s principal ground of appeal was that the judge had erred in finding that he intended to cause serious injury when the jury’s verdict of manslaughter rather than murder demonstrated that he had not intended really serious harm. It was submitted that there was no meaningful distinction in law between serious harm and really serious harm, both constituting the mens rea for murder. The court rejected this argument. Lord Justice Green held that the judge’s description of Mr Andrew’s intention as one to cause serious injury was based on what could be seen on the CCTV: Mr Andrew running up behind Mr Asbury, who was facing away and posed no threat, and deliberately stabbing him in the neck. Applying the criminal standard and giving the defendant the benefit of any doubt, the judge was entitled to characterise the conduct in those terms without acting inconsistently with the jury’s verdict. The court emphasised that harm and intent are relative concepts. Between an intention to cause trivial harm and the threshold of murderous intent lies a range of conduct which in everyday language would be described as an intention to cause serious injury. The judge used the word “serious” descriptively of this middle ground. He had expressly distinguished between an intention to cause really serious harm (which would have indicated murder) and an intention to cause serious injury falling short of that required for murder. The Sentencing Council’s definitive guideline for manslaughter envisages high culpability where death is caused in the course of an unlawful act involving an intention to cause harm falling just short of grievous bodily harm or which carried a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm. The sentence of 14 years was not manifestly excessive, the judge having heard the trial and carefully weighed all aggravating and mitigating factors, including Mr Andrew’s serious antecedent record which included a previous stabbing.
The court noted that the judge had failed to specify the 22 days Mr Andrew had spent in custody in Spain awaiting extradition. Under section 243(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 the court must specify such days in open court and they count as time served. The Crown properly drew this omission to the court’s attention. Permission was granted for this ground to be raised and the appeal was allowed to that limited extent. All other applications were dismissed.
Turning to Mr Kemp-Francis and Mr Sidhu, the court reviewed the relevant principles for sentencing perverting the course of justice offences. Key considerations include the seriousness of the substantive index offence, the degree of persistence in the conduct and the actual effect on the course of justice. The judge had taken those matters into account. Mr Kemp-Francis had been present when Mr Andrew delivered the fatal blow, drove him away to avoid arrest, knew he had handed the knife to Mr Sidhu, took him a long way to Derby enabling him to dispose of the knife and arrange to flee, and offered no cooperation to the police. Mr Sidhu took the knife and agreed to remove it, must have realised the context, participated in its disposal and lied in interview. The court held that deterrence was a legitimate sentencing consideration. Section 142(1B) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the court to have regard to the need to reduce crime and a deterrent element may reflect that need even absent prevalence. The judge had not given undue weight to deterrence. His detailed analysis reflected careful focus on the factors relevant to assessment. In Mr Kemp-Francis’s case the sentence of two years and six months was perfectly proper and not manifestly excessive.
However, in relation to Mr Sidhu the court concluded that some distinction should have been drawn between him and Mr Kemp-Francis. Mr Kemp-Francis’s proximity to the stabbing meant there could be no sensible doubt about his knowledge of what Mr Andrew had done with the knife, whereas it was unclear whether Mr Sidhu was aware of precisely what the knife had been used for. The judge had said only that Mr Sidhu would have inferred involvement in a serious public order offence. The Crown accepted there were two evidential differences: their involvement in the incident and the inferences that could be drawn as to their knowledge. The judge’s conclusion that there was no material difference between them was in error. The court set aside the sentence of two years and six months imposed on Mr Sidhu and substituted 22 months’ imprisonment to mark the proper distinction. Mr Sidhu’s appeal was allowed to that extent.
In a postscript the court observed that the CDs of CCTV footage submitted for viewing had been incompatible with the court’s technology, causing delay. Parties wishing the court to view video footage should liaise in advance to ensure compatibility and should prepare a short document summarising or indexing the footage and identifying the timing of salient events.
In short, Mr Andrew’s renewed application for permission to appeal sentence was refused save for an order that 22 days spent in custody in Spain should count as time served; Mr Kemp-Francis’s appeal against sentence was dismissed; and Mr Sidhu’s appeal was allowed in part, his sentence being reduced from 30 months to 22 months.
R v Janjua and Choudhury [1999] 1 Cr App R 91