RXG v Ministry of Justice & Ors [2019] EWHC 2026 (QB)
Summary
RXG v Ministry of Justice & Ors [2019] EWHC 2026 (QB) concerned an application by a young adult, convicted as a child of terrorism offences, for a contra mundum injunction extending reporting restrictions beyond his eighteenth birthday. The Divisional Court, comprising the President of the Queen’s Bench Division Dame Victoria Sharp and Mr Justice Nicklin, granted the injunction.
On 23 July 2015 the claimant RXG, then aged 14, pleaded guilty at Manchester Crown Court to two offences of inciting terrorism overseas contrary to section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The particulars alleged that in March 2015 he had incited another to commit acts of terrorism, namely the murder of police officers during an ANZAC Parade in Melbourne and the murder by beheading of a person in Australia. The Australian Federal Police were alerted and made arrests; no attacks were carried out. RXG was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of five years by Saunders J, who found that he had been groomed and radicalised by experienced online recruiters who had exploited a vulnerable child to carry out their wishes. The sentencing judge imposed reporting restrictions under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 preventing RXG from being identified whilst under 18. An application by media organisations to lift those restrictions was refused. In 2017 RXG was diagnosed with high-functioning autism. Recognising that the section 45 restrictions would lapse on his eighteenth birthday, RXG commenced these proceedings by Part 8 Claim Form in June 2018 seeking an injunction to extend the reporting restrictions beyond his majority. Sir Brian Leveson P granted an interim order. No media organisation sought to be joined or to oppose the application, although written submissions were received from the Press Association. The Ministry of Justice was added as a defendant but adopted a neutral position. The Attorney General instructed counsel as amicus curiae.
The principal evidence relied upon by RXG included letters from the Youth Justice Service and the Head of the children’s home in which RXG had been detained throughout his sentence, warning of potential repercussions if his name were released, including the risk of him being targeted by those seeking retaliation and the impact upon his family. A forensic psychologist, Dr Louise Bowers, assessed the likely impact of removing anonymity: she considered that naming RXG would cause distress and evoke feelings of shame and humiliation, would probably lead to mental health problems, and would make it very difficult or impossible for RXG to continue developing a pro-social identity. She warned that he would be shunned by peers, might disengage from professionals, and would face severe limits on his opportunities for education and employment. Rejection, social isolation and lack of meaningful activity had all been features of RXG’s life when he was offending, and a return to these circumstances was likely significantly to affect his mental state and undermine his rehabilitation. She noted that being labelled a terrorist would make reintegration extremely difficult and might cause RXG simply to give up. A forensic psychologist assessing RXG’s extremism risk found that loss of anonymity might increase his risk, particularly if transferred to the adult estate where he might be exposed to individuals engaged in extremism who might target him because of the controversial nature of his offence and his vulnerability. A clinical neuropsychologist, Dr David Murphy, considered that any breach in anonymity would be very difficult to manage and likely to have a detrimental effect on RXG. A consultant forensic psychiatrist expressed concern about RXG’s anxiety about moving to a Category A prison given his difficulties with mixing with and understanding others. RXG’s solicitor exhibited media reports and social media commentary which were overwhelmingly negative; a significant number of social media postings used violent language and some made threats against RXG.
The Ministry of Justice witness statement from the Executive Director for the Long-Term High Security Estate, Mr Richard Vince, stated that HMPPS had the knowledge and experience to manage RXG safely in the adult estate whether an anonymity order was in place or not. A risk assessment conducted by HMPPS in January 2019 concluded that there was no current assessed threat of real and immediate risk to life, either in the current secure setting or from the wider public, although it accepted that if the order were removed the level of threat could be raised, but that it was unlikely to escalate into real and immediate threats to life. The assessment judged that media reporting if RXG’s identity were made known was likely to disrupt his rehabilitation to some extent in the short term, which might be exacerbated by his identified vulnerabilities, but that management strategies could be effectively deployed to support rehabilitative progress and mitigate the impact.
The Court first addressed whether the jurisdiction to grant a contra mundum injunction extending anonymity beyond majority, established in Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430 and subsequently exercised in only three further cases (Mary Bell, Maxine Carr and Edlington), had survived the enactment of section 45A of the 1999 Act. Section 45A, inserted by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 with effect from 13 April 2015, conferred power to make a reporting direction protecting the identity during their lifetime of witnesses and victims under 18 at the commencement of proceedings. The Press Association had submitted that Parliament had deliberately excluded convicted child or youth defendants from the category of those eligible for lifetime anonymity orders under section 45A, and that it was not for the court to grant an injunction inconsistent with that statutory scheme. The Court held that the authorities established that the courts would decline to hold that Parliament had interfered with fundamental rights unless it had made its intentions crystal clear in the legislation. There was nothing in section 45A to suggest that Parliament intended to curtail the Venables jurisdiction. The Court was satisfied that Parliament, when enacting section 45A, had been fully aware of the Venables jurisdiction, had intended it to continue, and that the new section simply placed anonymity orders for witnesses and victims on a statutory footing. The Venables jurisdiction therefore remained available.
The Court reviewed the extensive jurisprudence on open justice and the exceptional nature of departures from it. It summarised the principles derived from the four cases in which the Venables jurisdiction had been exercised. Restrictions upon freedom of expression must be in accordance with the law, justifiable as necessary to satisfy a strong and pressing social need convincingly demonstrated to protect the rights of others, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The social needs which may in principle justify a restriction include the right to life and prohibition of torture under Articles 2 and 3 and the right to a private and family life under Article 8. The threshold at which Article 2 and/or 3 is engaged has been described variously but includes a real possibility of serious physical harm and possible death or a continuing danger of serious physical and psychological harm. Where evidence demonstrates a real and immediate risk of serious harm or death, that risk cannot be balanced against any Article 10 right, no matter how weighty, because the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 are unqualified. The Court respectfully departed from the proposition in Edlington that Article 2 and 3 rights could be balanced against Article 10. However, where evidence of a threat does not reach the standard that engages Articles 2 and/or 3, the evidence as to risk of harm will usually fall to be considered in the assessment of the person’s Article 8 rights and balanced against the engaged Article 10 rights. Article 8 rights may, depending on the facts, justify a contra mundum injunction; factors under Article 8 that have favoured such injunctions include the youth of an offender at the time of offending, the length of time elapsed since the offences, the likely impact upon mental or physical health if identified, and the fact that significant information beyond the new identity is already in the public domain enabling the media to comment freely. The making of a contra mundum injunction was regarded as exceptional in all the precedents, and notoriety which may be a consequence of serious offending would not of itself entitle an offender to an anonymity order based upon the likelihood of press intrusion.
On behalf of RXG, Mr Edward Fitzgerald QC contended that Articles 2 and 3 as well as Article 8 were engaged. He argued that identifying RXG would put him at risk of serious harm from third parties, would have a profound adverse impact on his psychological wellbeing, and would increase the risk he posed to himself. He submitted that RXG would be of interest to extremists who may target him to seek to indoctrinate him, that RXG’s rehabilitation would be jeopardised if he were identified, and that RXG’s family would be put at risk and there would be substantial adverse impact on the best interests of his siblings, who were children of primary school age. Mr Fitzgerald QC submitted that there would be intense media focus on RXG if the current order were lifted, that he would become instantly and globally infamous as the youngest person to be convicted of a terrorist conviction in this jurisdiction, and that some members of the public had expressed violent and threatening views about RXG in online comment sections and social media. He relied on the evidence of professionals involved in RXG’s care that he would be at increased risk of serious harm in prison and that harming notorious offenders was considered by some prisoners to be a badge of honour. He submitted that there was a real and immediate risk of serious harm and death and that granting anonymity was a reasonable step the Court was obliged to take. Alternatively, he submitted that granting an injunction was necessary under Article 8 because naming RXG would obstruct and harm his rehabilitation by making him irreversibly infamous, would ostracise him from ordinary society, would make it extremely difficult for him to find employment or make friends, and might expose the public to the risk of RXG committing further offences. He argued that damage to RXG’s rehabilitation could expose the public to risk because social isolation, rejection and lack of meaningful activity had been features of his life when he was offending. He submitted that RXG was of particular interest for propaganda purposes to ISIS and might be exploited by extremists given his vulnerabilities associated with his autism. He further submitted that harm to the family and the best interests of RXG’s sisters weighed in favour of an injunction.
Mr James Segan for the amicus curiae submitted that the evidence demonstrated little in terms of threats of harm. He noted that in response to threatening comments on social media, the Ministry of Justice had stated that the existence of the comments did not amount to an assessed threat against RXG and that there was no current assessed threat of a real and immediate risk to life. He submitted the evidence did not suggest that lifting the anonymity order was likely to result in any real and immediate threat to RXG’s life. He referred to Dr Bowers’ evidence that RXG was highly likely to comply with his licence conditions whether his identity was protected or not and that the adverse consequences for resettlement arose for most if not all young persons who had committed very serious offences whose identity had not been protected. He acknowledged that the Ministry of Justice accepted there was a risk of radicalisation if RXG’s identity became known to other prisoners and that there might be disruption to his rehabilitation in the short term if he became the subject of media reporting, but submitted that the Ministry’s assessment was that management strategies could be effectively deployed to support rehabilitative progress and mitigate the impact.
The Court rejected the submission that Articles 2 and 3 were engaged. It held that RXG had not convincingly established a real and immediate risk of serious harm if his identity were revealed. Most of the evidence was general, non-specific and speculative. The only evidence of identifiable threats came from social media and online comments, which were undoubtedly unpleasant but which, the Court found, represented rhetoric and invective generally insufficient without more to amount to a credible threat of violence or one engaging the Osman duty. The Court considered that the HMPPS Risk Assessment was a more reliable indication of the level of future threat and was satisfied that there was no current assessed threat of real and immediate risk to RXG’s life in his current setting or from the wider public. Such risks of harm which did exist were likely to be mitigated by the Prison Service and local police. The Court acknowledged that there existed a risk but it was speculative and did not amount to a real and immediate risk. The Court was satisfied that the Prison Service was very experienced in protecting high-profile criminals and was well-equipped to manage and mitigate that risk.
The Court therefore turned to the Article 8 and Article 10 balancing exercise. It held that the exercise was not a mechanical one to be decided upon the basis of rival generalities but a parallel analysis in which the starting point was presumptive parity, requiring an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights claimed in the individual case. The Court held that RXG’s Article 8 rights were clearly engaged by the impending lifting of the reporting restrictions. The evidence established that if RXG lost his anonymity he was liable to become the focus of significant media attention which, although likely to be short-lived, would leave an indelible record on the internet identifying him as the person who aged 14 was convicted of inciting acts of terrorism. The Court accepted that if he were named he would never escape being associated with his past offending. The Court noted that most youth and child defendants losing the protection of reporting restrictions at their eighteenth birthday would not have achieved anything like the notoriety of RXG and their coming of age was likely to go unremarked. The Court emphasised that there was a significant public interest in RXG’s continuing rehabilitation. The evidence compelled the conclusion that if RXG were identified it was likely to have a profound impact on his psychological wellbeing. The Court considered that the evidence of Dr Bowers clearly articulated the nature of the harm he would face from losing his anonymity. In terms of the factors identified in Mary Bell, the Court found that RXG’s case presented a combination of issues that made his case truly exceptional. He was a child at the time of his offences and the sentencing judge was satisfied that he had been groomed and radicalised by others who had exploited a particularly vulnerable child, a vulnerability explained by his later diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. The likely impact upon his mental health if identified was clearly established in the evidence. In the immediate term he risked being shunned and rejected by his peers as well as disengaging from professionals with whom he had developed a good relationship. In the longer term he would face ostracism and isolation in the community, the effects of which would be exacerbated by his autism. The Court emphasised that rejection, lack of meaningful activity and social isolation were all features of RXG’s life at the time he was offending and that a return to these circumstances was likely significantly to affect his mental state and undermine his rehabilitation. Allowing the stigma and shame of what RXG did as a child to come to define him as a young adult would probably halt his psychological development and continuing rehabilitation. The Court considered that although four years might appear a short time, in terms of the development of a child and particularly the intensive rehabilitation RXG had received, this represented a significant period. The evidence showed that RXG appeared to have left his terrorist identity behind and was well on the way to developing a new stable and pro-social identity. The principal reason for imposing the original reporting restriction had been to promote RXG’s rehabilitation, to avoid criminalising or stigmatising him, to support his reintegration into society and to recognise that his offending took place when he was only 14. The evidence demonstrated that loss of anonymity would present significant challenges and threats to RXG in terms of his rehabilitation and
On 23 July 2015 the claimant RXG, then aged 14, pleaded guilty at Manchester Crown Court to two offences of inciting terrorism overseas contrary to section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The particulars alleged that in March 2015 he had incited another to commit acts of terrorism, namely the murder of police officers during an ANZAC Parade in Melbourne and the murder by beheading of a person in Australia. The Australian Federal Police were alerted and made arrests; no attacks were carried out. RXG was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of five years by Saunders J, who found that he had been groomed and radicalised by experienced online recruiters who had exploited a vulnerable child to carry out their wishes. The sentencing judge imposed reporting restrictions under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 preventing RXG from being identified whilst under 18. An application by media organisations to lift those restrictions was refused. In 2017 RXG was diagnosed with high-functioning autism. Recognising that the section 45 restrictions would lapse on his eighteenth birthday, RXG commenced these proceedings by Part 8 Claim Form in June 2018 seeking an injunction to extend the reporting restrictions beyond his majority. Sir Brian Leveson P granted an interim order. No media organisation sought to be joined or to oppose the application, although written submissions were received from the Press Association. The Ministry of Justice was added as a defendant but adopted a neutral position. The Attorney General instructed counsel as amicus curiae.
The principal evidence relied upon by RXG included letters from the Youth Justice Service and the Head of the children’s home in which RXG had been detained throughout his sentence, warning of potential repercussions if his name were released, including the risk of him being targeted by those seeking retaliation and the impact upon his family. A forensic psychologist, Dr Louise Bowers, assessed the likely impact of removing anonymity: she considered that naming RXG would cause distress and evoke feelings of shame and humiliation, would probably lead to mental health problems, and would make it very difficult or impossible for RXG to continue developing a pro-social identity. She warned that he would be shunned by peers, might disengage from professionals, and would face severe limits on his opportunities for education and employment. Rejection, social isolation and lack of meaningful activity had all been features of RXG’s life when he was offending, and a return to these circumstances was likely significantly to affect his mental state and undermine his rehabilitation. She noted that being labelled a terrorist would make reintegration extremely difficult and might cause RXG simply to give up. A forensic psychologist assessing RXG’s extremism risk found that loss of anonymity might increase his risk, particularly if transferred to the adult estate where he might be exposed to individuals engaged in extremism who might target him because of the controversial nature of his offence and his vulnerability. A clinical neuropsychologist, Dr David Murphy, considered that any breach in anonymity would be very difficult to manage and likely to have a detrimental effect on RXG. A consultant forensic psychiatrist expressed concern about RXG’s anxiety about moving to a Category A prison given his difficulties with mixing with and understanding others. RXG’s solicitor exhibited media reports and social media commentary which were overwhelmingly negative; a significant number of social media postings used violent language and some made threats against RXG.
The Ministry of Justice witness statement from the Executive Director for the Long-Term High Security Estate, Mr Richard Vince, stated that HMPPS had the knowledge and experience to manage RXG safely in the adult estate whether an anonymity order was in place or not. A risk assessment conducted by HMPPS in January 2019 concluded that there was no current assessed threat of real and immediate risk to life, either in the current secure setting or from the wider public, although it accepted that if the order were removed the level of threat could be raised, but that it was unlikely to escalate into real and immediate threats to life. The assessment judged that media reporting if RXG’s identity were made known was likely to disrupt his rehabilitation to some extent in the short term, which might be exacerbated by his identified vulnerabilities, but that management strategies could be effectively deployed to support rehabilitative progress and mitigate the impact.
The Court first addressed whether the jurisdiction to grant a contra mundum injunction extending anonymity beyond majority, established in Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430 and subsequently exercised in only three further cases (Mary Bell, Maxine Carr and Edlington), had survived the enactment of section 45A of the 1999 Act. Section 45A, inserted by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 with effect from 13 April 2015, conferred power to make a reporting direction protecting the identity during their lifetime of witnesses and victims under 18 at the commencement of proceedings. The Press Association had submitted that Parliament had deliberately excluded convicted child or youth defendants from the category of those eligible for lifetime anonymity orders under section 45A, and that it was not for the court to grant an injunction inconsistent with that statutory scheme. The Court held that the authorities established that the courts would decline to hold that Parliament had interfered with fundamental rights unless it had made its intentions crystal clear in the legislation. There was nothing in section 45A to suggest that Parliament intended to curtail the Venables jurisdiction. The Court was satisfied that Parliament, when enacting section 45A, had been fully aware of the Venables jurisdiction, had intended it to continue, and that the new section simply placed anonymity orders for witnesses and victims on a statutory footing. The Venables jurisdiction therefore remained available.
The Court reviewed the extensive jurisprudence on open justice and the exceptional nature of departures from it. It summarised the principles derived from the four cases in which the Venables jurisdiction had been exercised. Restrictions upon freedom of expression must be in accordance with the law, justifiable as necessary to satisfy a strong and pressing social need convincingly demonstrated to protect the rights of others, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The social needs which may in principle justify a restriction include the right to life and prohibition of torture under Articles 2 and 3 and the right to a private and family life under Article 8. The threshold at which Article 2 and/or 3 is engaged has been described variously but includes a real possibility of serious physical harm and possible death or a continuing danger of serious physical and psychological harm. Where evidence demonstrates a real and immediate risk of serious harm or death, that risk cannot be balanced against any Article 10 right, no matter how weighty, because the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 are unqualified. The Court respectfully departed from the proposition in Edlington that Article 2 and 3 rights could be balanced against Article 10. However, where evidence of a threat does not reach the standard that engages Articles 2 and/or 3, the evidence as to risk of harm will usually fall to be considered in the assessment of the person’s Article 8 rights and balanced against the engaged Article 10 rights. Article 8 rights may, depending on the facts, justify a contra mundum injunction; factors under Article 8 that have favoured such injunctions include the youth of an offender at the time of offending, the length of time elapsed since the offences, the likely impact upon mental or physical health if identified, and the fact that significant information beyond the new identity is already in the public domain enabling the media to comment freely. The making of a contra mundum injunction was regarded as exceptional in all the precedents, and notoriety which may be a consequence of serious offending would not of itself entitle an offender to an anonymity order based upon the likelihood of press intrusion.
On behalf of RXG, Mr Edward Fitzgerald QC contended that Articles 2 and 3 as well as Article 8 were engaged. He argued that identifying RXG would put him at risk of serious harm from third parties, would have a profound adverse impact on his psychological wellbeing, and would increase the risk he posed to himself. He submitted that RXG would be of interest to extremists who may target him to seek to indoctrinate him, that RXG’s rehabilitation would be jeopardised if he were identified, and that RXG’s family would be put at risk and there would be substantial adverse impact on the best interests of his siblings, who were children of primary school age. Mr Fitzgerald QC submitted that there would be intense media focus on RXG if the current order were lifted, that he would become instantly and globally infamous as the youngest person to be convicted of a terrorist conviction in this jurisdiction, and that some members of the public had expressed violent and threatening views about RXG in online comment sections and social media. He relied on the evidence of professionals involved in RXG’s care that he would be at increased risk of serious harm in prison and that harming notorious offenders was considered by some prisoners to be a badge of honour. He submitted that there was a real and immediate risk of serious harm and death and that granting anonymity was a reasonable step the Court was obliged to take. Alternatively, he submitted that granting an injunction was necessary under Article 8 because naming RXG would obstruct and harm his rehabilitation by making him irreversibly infamous, would ostracise him from ordinary society, would make it extremely difficult for him to find employment or make friends, and might expose the public to the risk of RXG committing further offences. He argued that damage to RXG’s rehabilitation could expose the public to risk because social isolation, rejection and lack of meaningful activity had been features of his life when he was offending. He submitted that RXG was of particular interest for propaganda purposes to ISIS and might be exploited by extremists given his vulnerabilities associated with his autism. He further submitted that harm to the family and the best interests of RXG’s sisters weighed in favour of an injunction.
Mr James Segan for the amicus curiae submitted that the evidence demonstrated little in terms of threats of harm. He noted that in response to threatening comments on social media, the Ministry of Justice had stated that the existence of the comments did not amount to an assessed threat against RXG and that there was no current assessed threat of a real and immediate risk to life. He submitted the evidence did not suggest that lifting the anonymity order was likely to result in any real and immediate threat to RXG’s life. He referred to Dr Bowers’ evidence that RXG was highly likely to comply with his licence conditions whether his identity was protected or not and that the adverse consequences for resettlement arose for most if not all young persons who had committed very serious offences whose identity had not been protected. He acknowledged that the Ministry of Justice accepted there was a risk of radicalisation if RXG’s identity became known to other prisoners and that there might be disruption to his rehabilitation in the short term if he became the subject of media reporting, but submitted that the Ministry’s assessment was that management strategies could be effectively deployed to support rehabilitative progress and mitigate the impact.
The Court rejected the submission that Articles 2 and 3 were engaged. It held that RXG had not convincingly established a real and immediate risk of serious harm if his identity were revealed. Most of the evidence was general, non-specific and speculative. The only evidence of identifiable threats came from social media and online comments, which were undoubtedly unpleasant but which, the Court found, represented rhetoric and invective generally insufficient without more to amount to a credible threat of violence or one engaging the Osman duty. The Court considered that the HMPPS Risk Assessment was a more reliable indication of the level of future threat and was satisfied that there was no current assessed threat of real and immediate risk to RXG’s life in his current setting or from the wider public. Such risks of harm which did exist were likely to be mitigated by the Prison Service and local police. The Court acknowledged that there existed a risk but it was speculative and did not amount to a real and immediate risk. The Court was satisfied that the Prison Service was very experienced in protecting high-profile criminals and was well-equipped to manage and mitigate that risk.
The Court therefore turned to the Article 8 and Article 10 balancing exercise. It held that the exercise was not a mechanical one to be decided upon the basis of rival generalities but a parallel analysis in which the starting point was presumptive parity, requiring an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights claimed in the individual case. The Court held that RXG’s Article 8 rights were clearly engaged by the impending lifting of the reporting restrictions. The evidence established that if RXG lost his anonymity he was liable to become the focus of significant media attention which, although likely to be short-lived, would leave an indelible record on the internet identifying him as the person who aged 14 was convicted of inciting acts of terrorism. The Court accepted that if he were named he would never escape being associated with his past offending. The Court noted that most youth and child defendants losing the protection of reporting restrictions at their eighteenth birthday would not have achieved anything like the notoriety of RXG and their coming of age was likely to go unremarked. The Court emphasised that there was a significant public interest in RXG’s continuing rehabilitation. The evidence compelled the conclusion that if RXG were identified it was likely to have a profound impact on his psychological wellbeing. The Court considered that the evidence of Dr Bowers clearly articulated the nature of the harm he would face from losing his anonymity. In terms of the factors identified in Mary Bell, the Court found that RXG’s case presented a combination of issues that made his case truly exceptional. He was a child at the time of his offences and the sentencing judge was satisfied that he had been groomed and radicalised by others who had exploited a particularly vulnerable child, a vulnerability explained by his later diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. The likely impact upon his mental health if identified was clearly established in the evidence. In the immediate term he risked being shunned and rejected by his peers as well as disengaging from professionals with whom he had developed a good relationship. In the longer term he would face ostracism and isolation in the community, the effects of which would be exacerbated by his autism. The Court emphasised that rejection, lack of meaningful activity and social isolation were all features of RXG’s life at the time he was offending and that a return to these circumstances was likely significantly to affect his mental state and undermine his rehabilitation. Allowing the stigma and shame of what RXG did as a child to come to define him as a young adult would probably halt his psychological development and continuing rehabilitation. The Court considered that although four years might appear a short time, in terms of the development of a child and particularly the intensive rehabilitation RXG had received, this represented a significant period. The evidence showed that RXG appeared to have left his terrorist identity behind and was well on the way to developing a new stable and pro-social identity. The principal reason for imposing the original reporting restriction had been to promote RXG’s rehabilitation, to avoid criminalising or stigmatising him, to support his reintegration into society and to recognise that his offending took place when he was only 14. The evidence demonstrated that loss of anonymity would present significant challenges and threats to RXG in terms of his rehabilitation and