Ravinder Singh-Shergil & Vishal Soba [2019] EWCA Crim 847

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Ravinder Singh-Shergil v R & Vishal Soba v R [2019] EWCA Crim 847 was heard in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), comprising Lord Justice Gross, Mr Justice Goose and His Honour Judge Kinch QC sitting as a judge of the Court. Mr Singh-Shergil was refused leave to appeal his murder conviction and Mr Soba was refused leave to renew his application to appeal sentence for manslaughter.

On 15 June 2018 at the Central Criminal Court before His Honour Judge Moss QC, Mr Singh-Shergil was convicted of murder. On 14 June 2018 Mr Soba was convicted of manslaughter and on 11 June 2018 he was convicted of assisting an offender. On 22 June 2018 the judge sentenced Mr Singh-Shergil to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-six years and nine months less time on remand. Mr Soba was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and five years’ imprisonment concurrently for assisting an offender. A co-accused, Palwinder Multani, had pleaded guilty to manslaughter before trial and gave evidence for the prosecution.

On 30 July 2016 at approximately 11 pm Gurinder Singh and two friends travelled by car to Spires Bridge Road, Hayes, intending to buy cannabis. As one friend left the vehicle a Vauxhall Vectra pulled up and four men got out and attacked the deceased. The attackers used at least two swords, a knife and various blunt instruments. The deceased sustained almost fifty sites of injury to his head and body, including two severed fingers. During the attack the deceased attempted to flee but was knocked to the ground by the attackers’ Vauxhall Vectra, allowing the attack to continue. The prosecution alleged the attack was the culmination of a series of violent incidents involving the accused between 11 June and 17 July 2016, almost two weeks before the murder. The initial dispute was said to have been caused by an alleged affair between the wife of one co-accused and the deceased.

On 4 August 2016 police searched a storage unit near the scene and recovered two bags, one containing swords and knives used in the attack and another containing blood-stained clothing. CCTV recordings from the storage unit entrance showed Mr Soba arriving on 2 August with another man and carrying the two bags into the unit. Enquiries into telephone evidence and CCTV identified Multani as the driver of a silver Citroen waiting near the deceased’s home and following him to the scene. Multani was arrested and in interview described the attack and outlined his role. He later became the principal prosecution witness. The trial commenced on 19 March 2018 after an earlier listing was adjourned when Multani indicated willingness to give evidence for the prosecution.

The prosecution’s case was that Mr Singh-Shergil had been actively involved in the violent dispute and was instrumental in organising and engaging in the fatal attack. The prosecution relied on evidence of the previous incidents and on Multani’s evidence. Multani knew Mr Singh-Shergil and placed him at the scene and central to an aborted fight in the lead-up to the murder. Multani described Mr Singh-Shergil as having a lead role in a later attack on a man called Bhutta at his home address and as playing a significant role in other violent incidents before 30 July 2016. On that day Multani said Mr Singh-Shergil told him to drive others to Spires Bridge Road where the deceased was with friends. Telephone contact linked Mr Singh-Shergil closely with the planning and execution of the attack. Multani gave evidence over ten days and was firmly cross-examined. It was suggested to him that he had played a greater role than he admitted and that in minimising his own involvement he exaggerated the involvement of others, including the applicants, to improve his sentencing position. Inconsistencies in his evidence were highlighted in cross-examination.

Mr Singh-Shergil was the only defendant to give evidence. He denied any involvement in the incident or knowledge of or participation in the killing. He explained that he had loaned his BMW motor vehicle to another man, which accounted for it being seen in London rather than Birmingham at material times. He stated that Multani had been lying when describing him as involved in any of the offending. He also said he had lent one of his mobile phones to another man, so the cell site evidence connecting that phone to the offence did not incriminate him.

The jury retired on 30 May 2018. On 1 June 2018 they asked to see Multani’s police interviews and witness statements of Mr Bhutta and his wife. These had not been placed before the jury during trial and, after discussion with all counsel, the judge informed the jury they could not have that material. Later that day, on the third day of retirement, the jury sent a note asking four questions: “(1) Did Bhutta name Jinder at the hospital? (2) Did Bhutta name Jinder in his police statement? (3) On 30 July does the 7224 co-locate with the Jinder car? (4) Did Multani name the assailants in the 6 October police interview?” Although disputed during trial whether “Jinder” referred to Mr Singh-Shergil or another man, it was plain the first three questions were connected with him. After the note was shown to all counsel, the prosecution suggested the questions should be simply answered. It did not appear controversial at the time that all answers were to be answered in the affirmative.

Mr Blunt QC for Mr Singh-Shergil submitted before the judge that the jury should be reminded of more of the evidence because the questions concerned highly contentious issues. However the judge declined that invitation and answered the questions with short affirmative responses without reminding the jury of other evidence. On 15 June 2018 the jury convicted Mr Singh-Shergil of murder.

Mr Blunt and junior counsel Miss O’Sullivan raised a single ground of appeal against conviction. It was based on the trial judge’s refusal to contextualise the answers to the four jury questions with specific reference to Mr Singh-Shergil’s case. It was argued that by his refusal the judge caused serious and significant prejudice to fair consideration of his case. It was submitted that by answering the questions in the simple affirmative he gave an illusory impression of witness consistency when there was not. It was argued that a simple affirmative answer to the first and second questions failed to identify the rival contentions about the reliability of Mr Bhutta’s evidence. In particular Mr Bhutta had been cross-examined by Mr Blunt based on a short crime report of his complaint within which he had not described Mr Singh-Shergil as an attacker at an earlier incident. However when cross-examination had almost been completed the prosecution disclosed the full crime report in which Mr Bhutta did describe Mr Singh-Shergil as one of the attackers. It was agreed between prosecution and defence that rather than recall Mr Bhutta an agreed note would be read to the jury identifying the late disclosure and any other inconsistencies. It was submitted that it was insufficient to answer the first two questions with a simple affirmative answer without further explanation.

It was further submitted that the jury should have been given fuller contextualised answers to questions three and four, explaining the evidence relating to the applicant’s phone and car so as not to implicate him. Additionally it was said that any reference to Multani naming assailants in his police interview should have included the challenges to his credibility. In the course of submissions before the Court of Appeal Mr Blunt said the answer to the fourth question should have been in the negative, not the positive. This did not appear to have been said to the trial judge at the time. It appeared both judge and counsel interpreted the question more strictly, as asking if assailants had been mentioned rather than who they were. The evidence was that Multani had named the assailants in his police interview, but not, said Mr Blunt, the applicant whom he named in his later statements. This inconsistency had been at the forefront of the applicant’s case and the jury were well aware of it from closing speeches and the summing-up. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been entitled to treat the fourth question as asking if Multani had mentioned “the assailants” in his police interview rather than who they were. The court said this for three reasons: first, although Mr Blunt was asking for fuller answers, neither counsel nor the judge considered the jury wanted to have the names of the assailants; second, the fourth question asked was not “Who were the assailants named by Multani?” but “Did Multani name the assailants in 6 October police interview?”; third, the jury did not raise supplementary questions asking for the named assailants after the simple affirmative answer, which they would have done had it been an area of interest. Accordingly the court did not think that answering all the questions affirmatively was wrong.

On behalf of the respondent Mr Kent QC submitted that the judge was required to provide an answer to the four questions and not to remind the jury of other evidence that might have been relevant. It was significant that the answers given did not provoke further questions from the jury asking to be reminded of any other evidence. It was submitted that the judge was entitled to expect the jury to understand the issues and rival contentions, given that they had heard closing speeches and had been given directions as well as a summary of the evidence. It was not incumbent upon the judge to second-guess the jury as to their reasons for asking their questions or to repeat the evidence of the rival contentions.

The Court of Appeal recognised that when the jury asked the four questions the defence would have preferred a fuller response than was given by the judge. Not surprisingly the applicant would have liked to remind the jury of his contentions in respect of each of the topics of evidence upon which the questions were based. However that did not mean the judge was required to do more than answer strictly the questions raised. The jury’s note was written during the third day of retirement after a long trial. The jury would undoubtedly have had in their minds the rival contentions between prosecution and defence upon the evidence as well as the judge’s careful summing-up with the legal directions. In the absence of any ambiguity or lack of clarity in the questions asked it was not necessary for the judge to interrogate the jury or to embark upon a further summary of evidence or of the rival contentions. There were no grounds for suspecting that the jury were not fully aware of the issues and the rival contentions. The judge at trial had a proper understanding of the issues and whether expanded answers were needed. In exercising a proper judicial discretion and refusing to say more the judge could not be criticised. The court did not accept that the judge fell into error. The fact that the jury asked no supplementary questions nor asked to be reminded of evidence relevant to the four questions reinforced the court’s view that the judge correctly answered the questions in the way that he did. The court was not persuaded that the judge fell into error.

The court further held that even if it had been persuaded that the judge should have said more, it did not follow that it would have encompassed all the points raised on behalf of Mr Singh-Shergil. Whilst he would have preferred the jury to be reminded of all the salient points, it did not mean the judge was bound to do so, even if it were accepted that more than simple affirmative answers were needed. If the judge had acceded to the applicant’s request it would have been necessary to remind the jury of all the evidence on the topic to achieve a balance, not just the points the defence wanted. This would have led to a repetition of the process which had already been completed during the summing-up. The applicant’s complaint about the way the judge dealt with the questions was based upon speculating why the jury were interested in the material they were asking about. This did not provide a basis for requiring the judge to do more than he did, which was to truthfully answer the questions that were asked without further significant comment. The court was unpersuaded that the failure to expand upon the answers meant that the applicant’s conviction was arguably unsafe. The jury were given the correct answers by the judge and they continued in their deliberations. The court saw no arguable basis that the conviction was unsafe and accordingly the application for permission to appeal against conviction was dismissed.

Turning to Mr Soba’s renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence, although there was evidence that he was the driver of the car which knocked the deceased to the ground during the attack, the judge could not be sure he was in fact the driver. His conviction for manslaughter meant the jury were sure he had participated in the attack intending some harm falling short of really serious harm. The judge concluded he had played an important role in the attack and the events that followed it, including concealing the weapons and clothing used in the attack. Mr Soba was aged thirty-one and had previous convictions for kidnapping and criminal damage but no previous convictions or cautions for violence. It was submitted on his behalf that his sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. Further it was argued that when compared with Multani, whose sentence starting point was eighteen years, his sentence involved objectionable disparity. Given his more limited role it was submitted that a significantly lower sentence should have been imposed.

In refusing leave to appeal against sentence the single judge identified that Mr Soba was involved in a long-running feud which involved repeated violence. He was part of the planning to attack the deceased, which he knew would involve violence and some injury. His culpability was increased by the assistance he provided to the murderers after the event to hide the weapons and clothing used. Further there was no arguable disparity when Multani’s sentence was longer, subject to his plea and assistance to the prosecution. The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons given by the single judge that the appeal was not arguable. Mr Soba played an important part in a violent group attack which led to the death of the deceased and assisted in hiding the weapons and clothing afterwards. His sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment could not be criticised. The renewed application for permission to appeal was also refused.

In short, Mr Singh-Shergil’s conviction for murder was held to be safe, the judge having correctly answered the jury’s questions without being obliged to rehearse the rival contentions of which they were already well aware, and Mr Soba’s manslaughter sentence of sixteen years was not manifestly excessive.

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