Pari-Jones v Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EWHC 3482 (Admin)
Summary
Pari-Jones v Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EWHC 3482 (Admin) concerned an appeal by way of case stated from the North West Wales Magistrates’ Court, in which Mrs Justice Andrews allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for retrial after the magistrates had refused an adjournment in circumstances where neither the defendant nor her solicitor could attend due to severe weather conditions.
Mrs Pari-Jones, an elderly lady approaching 80 years of age, had been charged with criminal damage to a wooden fence belonging to her neighbours. The matter arose from a neighbours’ dispute involving an incident in Caernarfon on 19 September 2016, though the requisition was not issued until 20 December 2017. A not guilty plea had been entered and a half-day trial was listed for 2 March 2018. On the morning of trial, during weather conditions described as the “Beast from the East” when official advice was that nobody should venture out unless absolutely necessary, the defence solicitor sent two emails to the court. At 9.23am he explained that the appellant was very concerned about the freezing weather and had no electricity, and that he himself was in Pwllheli and although he could reach the gritted main road, he was not comfortable venturing out. At 10.34am he updated the court to say that the main road from Pwllheli to Caernarfon had now closed and it was snowing heavily, meaning he could not travel. The prosecutor responded in neutral terms, noting that it was a matter for the court, but pointing out that two prosecution witnesses of similar age to the defendant had managed to attend and were concerned about the trial not proceeding.
The magistrates refused the adjournment and proceeded in the absence of both the appellant and her legal representative. They stated that the defence solicitor should have attended and that the information was vague as to whether he could do so, notwithstanding that they had been told the main road was closed and it was snowing heavily. They also criticised the solicitor for not providing information about making alternative arrangements for representation. They considered it in the interests of justice to proceed because the prosecution witnesses had managed to get through the bad weather and were of a similar age to the defendant. The magistrates made clear in their case stated that they had not been referred to any legal provisions or relevant authorities.
On appeal, Mrs Pari-Jones contended that no reasonable bench properly directing itself could have refused the adjournment in those circumstances. Mrs Justice Andrews considered the principles set out by Jack LJ in Crown Prosecution Service v Picton [2006] EWHC 1108 (Admin), which summarised guidance from earlier cases by Lord Bingham. Those principles included that whilst adjournment applications should be rigorously scrutinised and expedition is important, the court must consider whether the accused will be able fully to present their defence if the adjournment is refused. The court must also consider whether the circumstances giving rise to the application were the fault of the person seeking it, and if they were not at fault, that may favour an adjournment. The duty is to do justice between the parties in the circumstances as they have arisen.
Mrs Justice Andrews held that the magistrates had not applied the correct legal principles, as their attention had not been drawn to the relevant authorities. They had not considered whether anyone was at fault and, if so, who or the gravity of any such fault. They had not expressly considered that this was a weather problem beyond anyone’s control. They had not considered the impact on the defence of refusing the adjournment, which would mean not only that the defendant could not give her own account of events, but that she would have no legal representative to challenge the prosecution witnesses’ evidence. The magistrates appeared to have decided to refuse the adjournment simply because the prosecution witnesses had managed to attend, but this could not justify assuming that the appellant was exaggerating her difficulties or had no legitimate excuse. It was not known whether the neighbours had stayed overnight in a hotel or how they had managed to travel. The outcome meant that the defence simply could not be presented, depriving the elderly lady of any opportunity to explain how the damage came about or to challenge the prosecution evidence for reasons entirely beyond her control.
Mrs Justice Andrews acknowledged that a decision whether to adjourn is within the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will interfere only if very clear grounds are shown. It was not for the High Court to substitute its own views on the merits, but only to interfere in exceptional cases where no reasonable bench properly directing itself could have reached the decision in question. The judge noted that there was no evidence that the appellant had failed to attend on previous occasions, nor any indication that an adjournment would cause unprecedented delay or real difficulty with witness recollection, given that the incident had occurred some 18 months previously. The appellant had attended for sentence on 6 March when weather conditions had improved.
Mrs Justice Andrews concluded that if the magistrates had taken into account all the relevant considerations and balanced the appellant’s right to a fair trial with the lack of fault caused by weather conditions, the fact that she had already attended court previously, and all other relevant matters, they could not have refused the adjournment. The question stated for the opinion of the court was whether the decision to proceed was one that no reasonable bench could have come to based on the information available. The judge answered that question in the affirmative, holding that it was plainly a decision no reasonable bench could have reached had it applied the correct legal principles when exercising its discretion. In short, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the magistrates for the trial to take place on a convenient date.
Mrs Pari-Jones, an elderly lady approaching 80 years of age, had been charged with criminal damage to a wooden fence belonging to her neighbours. The matter arose from a neighbours’ dispute involving an incident in Caernarfon on 19 September 2016, though the requisition was not issued until 20 December 2017. A not guilty plea had been entered and a half-day trial was listed for 2 March 2018. On the morning of trial, during weather conditions described as the “Beast from the East” when official advice was that nobody should venture out unless absolutely necessary, the defence solicitor sent two emails to the court. At 9.23am he explained that the appellant was very concerned about the freezing weather and had no electricity, and that he himself was in Pwllheli and although he could reach the gritted main road, he was not comfortable venturing out. At 10.34am he updated the court to say that the main road from Pwllheli to Caernarfon had now closed and it was snowing heavily, meaning he could not travel. The prosecutor responded in neutral terms, noting that it was a matter for the court, but pointing out that two prosecution witnesses of similar age to the defendant had managed to attend and were concerned about the trial not proceeding.
The magistrates refused the adjournment and proceeded in the absence of both the appellant and her legal representative. They stated that the defence solicitor should have attended and that the information was vague as to whether he could do so, notwithstanding that they had been told the main road was closed and it was snowing heavily. They also criticised the solicitor for not providing information about making alternative arrangements for representation. They considered it in the interests of justice to proceed because the prosecution witnesses had managed to get through the bad weather and were of a similar age to the defendant. The magistrates made clear in their case stated that they had not been referred to any legal provisions or relevant authorities.
On appeal, Mrs Pari-Jones contended that no reasonable bench properly directing itself could have refused the adjournment in those circumstances. Mrs Justice Andrews considered the principles set out by Jack LJ in Crown Prosecution Service v Picton [2006] EWHC 1108 (Admin), which summarised guidance from earlier cases by Lord Bingham. Those principles included that whilst adjournment applications should be rigorously scrutinised and expedition is important, the court must consider whether the accused will be able fully to present their defence if the adjournment is refused. The court must also consider whether the circumstances giving rise to the application were the fault of the person seeking it, and if they were not at fault, that may favour an adjournment. The duty is to do justice between the parties in the circumstances as they have arisen.
Mrs Justice Andrews held that the magistrates had not applied the correct legal principles, as their attention had not been drawn to the relevant authorities. They had not considered whether anyone was at fault and, if so, who or the gravity of any such fault. They had not expressly considered that this was a weather problem beyond anyone’s control. They had not considered the impact on the defence of refusing the adjournment, which would mean not only that the defendant could not give her own account of events, but that she would have no legal representative to challenge the prosecution witnesses’ evidence. The magistrates appeared to have decided to refuse the adjournment simply because the prosecution witnesses had managed to attend, but this could not justify assuming that the appellant was exaggerating her difficulties or had no legitimate excuse. It was not known whether the neighbours had stayed overnight in a hotel or how they had managed to travel. The outcome meant that the defence simply could not be presented, depriving the elderly lady of any opportunity to explain how the damage came about or to challenge the prosecution evidence for reasons entirely beyond her control.
Mrs Justice Andrews acknowledged that a decision whether to adjourn is within the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will interfere only if very clear grounds are shown. It was not for the High Court to substitute its own views on the merits, but only to interfere in exceptional cases where no reasonable bench properly directing itself could have reached the decision in question. The judge noted that there was no evidence that the appellant had failed to attend on previous occasions, nor any indication that an adjournment would cause unprecedented delay or real difficulty with witness recollection, given that the incident had occurred some 18 months previously. The appellant had attended for sentence on 6 March when weather conditions had improved.
Mrs Justice Andrews concluded that if the magistrates had taken into account all the relevant considerations and balanced the appellant’s right to a fair trial with the lack of fault caused by weather conditions, the fact that she had already attended court previously, and all other relevant matters, they could not have refused the adjournment. The question stated for the opinion of the court was whether the decision to proceed was one that no reasonable bench could have come to based on the information available. The judge answered that question in the affirmative, holding that it was plainly a decision no reasonable bench could have reached had it applied the correct legal principles when exercising its discretion. In short, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the magistrates for the trial to take place on a convenient date.