Nader Eldarf, Harrow Crown Court 23 September 2018

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In Nader Eldarf, Harrow Crown Court 23 September 2018, the Crown Court allowed an appeal against conviction for driving while using a hand-held interactive communication device, holding that a driver who held his iPhone and touched the screen to change a pre-downloaded song was not “using” the device within regulation 110 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations.

On 23 May 2018 Willesden Magistrates’ Court convicted the appellant of driving a motor vehicle while using an interactive communication device, namely a hand-held mobile device, contrary to regulation 110(1), section 41D of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The Crown Court allowed the appeal on Friday 21 September 2018, gave its reasons orally, and provided them later in writing.

The facts were agreed. On 11 August 2017 at 13.35 a traffic officer saw the appellant driving a Ford Transit van westbound on the A406 at Wembley, holding a handset in front of his face with his left hand while his thumb operated the touch screen. He did not appear to be having a conversation, no cradle was in place, and a hands-free set was available but unused. He told the officer that he was changing the songs on his phone and was not texting. On oath he said that the music had already been downloaded and was not being streamed, and he demonstrated what he had been doing. He was 34, of good character and had a clean licence, and he was not cross-examined. It was accepted that he was not using any external interactive communication function. No authority was cited, the court being told that there was none.

The prosecution argued that any physical operation of the handset was an interactive communication between the driver and the device, that external communication was immaterial, and that the regulation should be construed purposively to penalise any use of a handset with the potential to distract. The appellant argued that the regulation, read as a whole, contemplated interactive communication with an external agency or network; it did not catch a driver doing the same thing with an iPod, and other provisions, including careless driving, could penalise such conduct, so that he had been charged with the wrong offence.

The court described the regulation as “unnecessarily tortuous in concept”, because it turns on the character of the device rather than its uses and nowhere defines “using”. Construing it as a whole, with regard to its discernible purpose, the deeming provision in paragraph (6)(a) and the non-exhaustive list in paragraph (6)(c), the court held that its essential purpose is to prohibit use while driving of the external interactive communication functionality of mobile telephones and similar devices. Each function listed in paragraph (6)(c), whether sending or receiving messages, faxes or images or providing internet access, concerns external interactivity, and none concerns internal activity between user and device. Had the intention been to prohibit any physical operation of the handset, the regulation could have said so simply.

The court tested the point with examples put in argument. A driver scratching his head with a dead phone would not be within the regulation, although he might be guilty of careless driving under section 3, and both parties agreed. The court took the same view of checking the time from the device’s internal memory or adjusting its internal system, rejecting the prosecution’s contention that the regulation was engaged there. The key words “interactive” and “communication” showed that the regulation is driven by the device’s function of external connectivity, and the three statutory defences in paragraph (5), each predicated on a telephone call, illustrated that logic. The court declined to extend the regulation to uses such as music storage that may not have been contemplated when it was drafted, since that would strain its words and clear purpose.

On the agreed facts, the appellant was doing no more than operating an internal function of his phone, and whatever other offence he may have committed, the court was not satisfied that he had committed the offence under regulation 110.

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