Lucy Connolly [2025] EWCA Crim 657
Summary
**R v Lucy Connolly [2025] EWCA Crim 657** was an appeal against sentence heard by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) comprising Lord Justice Holroyde, Mr Justice Goss and Mr Justice Sheldon. The application for leave to appeal was refused.
The applicant had pleaded guilty on 2 September 2024 to an offence of inciting racial hatred contrary to section 19(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. On 31 October 2024 the Recorder of Birmingham, HH Judge Inman KC, sentenced her to 31 months’ imprisonment.
On 29 July 2024, the day of the Southport stabbings in which three children were murdered, Ms Connolly, a childminder then aged 41 with approximately 9,000 followers on X (formerly Twitter), posted a message at 8.30 pm stating “Mass deportation now. Set fire to all the fucking hotels full of the bastards for all I care. While you’re at it, take the treacherous government and politicians with them. I feel physically sick knowing what these families will now have to endure. If that makes me racist, so be it.” The post was viewed 310,000 times and reposted 940 times before being removed by the applicant some three and a half hours later. Investigations revealed other messages indicating hostile views about illegal immigrants, including a post on 25 July responding to video shared by Tommy Robinson of a black male being tackled to the ground, saying “Somalian, I guess. Loads of them” with a vomiting emoji, and a post on 3 August responding to an anti-racism protest suggesting protesters should “sign a waiver to say they don’t mind if it’s one of their family that gets attacked, butchered, raped etc, by unvetted criminals”. WhatsApp messages on 5 August showed Ms Connolly was aware of the backlash, saying she would claim she had been the victim of doxing and would “play the mental health card” if arrested. She published a drafted apology on X on 6 August, later telling others she had done so for her husband’s sake. In interview under caution she admitted posting the tweet, saying her own child had died in horrendous circumstances and the Southport stabbings had put her into a rage, but claimed she felt hatred about the incident and circumstances, not about race.
The prosecution from the outset made clear that the case was brought under section 19(1)(a) on the basis that the applicant had acted with intent to stir up racial hatred. The offence may be committed either with such intent or, without such intent, where racial hatred is likely to be stirred up. At the Crown Court on 2 September 2024 Ms Connolly pleaded guilty without putting forward any basis of plea and did not challenge the prosecution’s categorisation of the offence. The prosecution submitted culpability fell into category A (high culpability) because the case involved “intention to incite serious violence” and harm fell into category 1 because she had published a message which “directly encourages activity which threatens or endangers life”. For a category A1 offence the Sentencing Council guideline indicated a starting point of three years’ custody with a range of two to six years. The prosecution further submitted that the timing, during a particularly sensitive social climate, was an aggravating factor. Widespread disorder, violence and criminal damage had erupted in multiple locations across the country from 30 July onwards, beginning in Southport and spreading to Manchester, Hartlepool, Aldershot, London, Sunderland, Liverpool, Belfast, Nottingham, Hull, Rotherham, Middlesbrough, Birmingham, Plymouth and Darlington over the following days. A pre-sentence report recorded that in 2011 the applicant’s son, then 19 months old, had died in circumstances giving rise to complaints of negligence against medical practitioners and that she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. The author noted the applicant had denied her tweet had racist undertones or could incite hatred or violence and had downplayed her behaviour. A psychiatric report from 2012 diagnosed a severe bereavement reaction classified as a form of adjustment disorder with persisting symptoms. The defence, represented at sentence by Mr Liam Muir, did not dispute the categorisation but submitted in mitigation the absence of previous convictions, positive good character, some remorse, the impact on her 12‑year‑old daughter, the personal mitigation relating to her son’s death, and that she faced a first custodial sentence in difficult prison conditions. Mr Muir also submitted that messages on 31 July showed that “whatever Ms Connolly’s intent … was on posting the offending post, that intention was short lived and she did not expect or intend the significant violence to follow in that she very quickly tried to quell it.”
The Recorder accepted culpability was in category A and harm in category 1, noting also that the applicant had sought and achieved widespread dissemination of her message. He found a significant aggravating factor in the timing of the publication during a particularly sensitive social climate, stating it would be difficult to think of a more sensitive time than during the evening of 29 July that year. A significant increase above the starting point was therefore required. The Recorder took into account the absence of previous convictions, the character references, the effect on the applicant’s daughter and the fact she would be serving a first custodial sentence in the present prison conditions. He accepted that although the tweet had been widely read she had not repeated any such statement, had in due course taken it down, and had sent some messages to the effect that violence was not the answer. Regarding the death of her son, the Recorder noted there was no recent psychiatric evidence and while she may have understood the grief of those who suffered their own tragic losses in Southport, she did not send a message of understanding and comfort but rather an incitement to hatred. There was no evidence of any mental disorder having any material effect on her committing the offence. The Recorder found it clear from the evidence of her own words in the days following her actions, what she said to the police and what she said to the probation officer that she had little insight into or acceptance of her actions. Balancing all factors, the Recorder concluded the appropriate sentence before reduction for guilty plea would have been three years six months’ imprisonment. Reducing that by 25 per cent to reflect the guilty plea which had not been indicated at the first opportunity, he imposed the sentence of 31 months.
On appeal, Mr Adam King submitted the sentence was manifestly excessive, first because the Recorder miscategorised the offence and should have assessed culpability as falling into category B (medium culpability) since the applicant was prepared to accept she intended to stir up racial hatred but had always denied intending to incite serious violence, and secondly because the mitigating factors significantly outweighed the aggravating factors, warranting a reduction below the guideline starting point and consideration of a suspended sentence. Mr King argued it was clear from the words of the tweet that it was “angry hyperbole” and could not be regarded as an incitement to serious violence. He also contended the Recorder overstated the aggravating feature and dealt only briefly and unenthusiastically with factors amounting to very significant mitigation. As an essential part of his argument, Mr King submitted the applicant had never understood that it was being conceded on her behalf that she had intended to incite serious violence and would never have admitted to having such an intention. This raised an issue as to the advice given by Mr Muir. The applicant waived privilege and both she and Mr Muir gave oral evidence to the Court of Appeal.
Ms Connolly gave evidence that when she heard the news from Southport she felt really angry, upset and distraught because children were dead and she knew how the parents felt. Before she posted her tweet the false information on social media that the murderer was an illegal immigrant had had an impact on her. But she did not intend anyone to set fire to migrant hotels or murder politicians. She later calmed down and deleted the tweet because she knew it was not an acceptable thing to say. In cross‑examination she said she was “just angry” when she posted the tweet and described the reference to burning hotels as “just a flippant remark”. Her evidence was that Mr Muir had never shown her the sentencing guideline or explained it to her and there was no discussion of whether she intended to incite serious violence. She accepted that on 12 August 2024 she had signed a document written by Mr Muir (referred to as “the endorsement”) which stated “I Lucy Connolly confirm that I do not wish to enter a basis of plea and I understand that this means I am conceding that at the point I published the tweet I intended to incite as per the category 1 feature. I do this as I do not believe I will be successful at a Newton hearing and I do not want to risk my credit. This is my decision under no pressure from anyone else. I know therefore that this would be a category 1A offence with a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment.” She said she did not know what category A1 meant and it was not explained to her. She accepted Mr Muir had gone through his sentencing note with her and she was content with it, but maintained she did not know the prosecution were alleging she intended to incite serious violence and did not understand she was accepting such an intent.
Mr Muir gave evidence that he spoke to the applicant for about 30 to 40 minutes on 12 August 2024 before the hearing and explained the options open to her, including pleading guilty and putting forward a basis of her plea. He explained the prosecution alleged culpability A and there would be a Newton hearing if she pleaded guilty but denied having the alleged intent. He further explained that if she was admitting she intended to stir up racial hatred she might have difficulty explaining how, despite using the words she did, she did not intend to incite serious violence. He also told her an unsuccessful Newton hearing could result in reduced credit for her guilty plea. His evidence was that he had shown the sentencing guideline to the applicant on his laptop screen and told her it would be possible to argue that the intent was short‑lived so the judge may be persuaded to move down from the starting point of three years. He wanted to be sure she understood the ramifications of the guideline because she would be making a concession about its application. After explaining all the options he invited the applicant to sign the endorsement and she did so. Mr Muir gave evidence that at further conferences, including immediately before the hearing on 2 September 2024, he discussed the guideline with her and confirmed she still wished to plead guilty and not to advance any basis of plea. He said he showed her the sentencing notes, as he always did with his clients, both because it was the right thing to do and because the client would hear about those notes in court. He denied the allegation that he had never shown the sentencing guideline to the applicant, repeating that he had shown it to her on each occasion. He added that the applicant was an intelligent woman who did not trust the prosecution and that she would not have signed the endorsement if she did not know what was meant by the reference to category 1A.
Lord Justice Holroyde, giving the judgment of the court, rejected Mr King’s argument that a close textual analysis of the offending tweet led to the conclusion that it was no more than an expression of emotion which could not be taken seriously. The words of the tweet were on their face an incitement to serious violence. It was unsurprising that the prosecution made clear throughout that they viewed the offence as involving category A culpability and unsurprising that Mr Muir advised the applicant about the strength of the prosecution case on that issue and warned her she would likely find it difficult to admit an intention to stir up racial hatred but to deny that the words she had chosen to use were intended to incite serious violence. The applicant had willingly pleaded guilty some four weeks after her first arrest, had not put forward any basis of her plea, and had expressly refrained from any challenge to the categorisation suggested by the prosecution. The plain meaning of the words and the clarity with which the parties had prepared their sentencing notes and made their oral submissions made it impossible to argue that the Recorder should have placed the offence into a lower category of culpability. By section 60(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020 it was the Recorder’s duty to decide which of the categories in the guideline most resembled the applicant’s case in order to identify the sentencing starting point. The Recorder was entitled and indeed obviously correct to categorise the case as he did.
The court considered with care the oral evidence and accepted the evidence of Mr Muir. He struck the court as a conscientious defence lawyer with a clear grasp of the relevant law, practice and procedure and a realistic appraisal of the issues in the case. His response to Mr King’s surprising suggestion that he might in some way have bypassed the obligation to give written notice of an intended basis of plea was telling. His evidence made it clear he had followed his usual practice and the court rejected the suggestion he gave this client no advice at all on matters of central importance. No reason was suggested why he might have adopted such an approach and the contemporaneous records he made supported his evidence. The court regretted to say it found the evidence of the applicant about these important matters incredible. Her evidence to the court showed her to be intelligent and articulate with strong views. Given her personal circumstances at the time of her arrest and her understandable concern for her daughter, any reference to a prison sentence based on a starting point of three years must have caused her great anxiety. In those circumstances the court was quite unable to accept that she signed the endorsement without any understanding of its references to the culpability factor or the starting point or that her state of ignorance in that regard continued throughout further conferences with Mr Muir or that she entered her guilty plea with no understanding of what it entailed. Her acceptance that she read and was content with Mr Muir’s sentencing note, which included references to the sentencing guideline and to the aggravating feature specifically mentioned in the guideline, clearly showed she was well aware of what she was admitting. Ground 1 was therefore unarguable.
As to ground 2, the court held it was not suggested the Recorder failed to identify any relevant mitigating factor. It was primarily for a sentencing judge to weigh the various aggravating and mitigating factors and to reach a conclusion as to what, if any, upwards or downwards adjustment should be made to the appropriate guideline starting point. This court would not interfere merely because it felt that some judges might have reached a slightly different conclusion; an applicant must show the judge imposed a sentence which was outside the range properly open to him or her. The court had every sympathy with the applicant over the death of her son and could understand why she remained angry about the circumstances of his death, and could accept that the shocking events in Southport had an impact on her which went beyond that felt by many others. But as the Recorder rightly said, she did not post a message of support and sympathy to the victims of the Southport attack and the bereaved. Nor did she post a message of hostility confined to the perpetrator of the Southport attack. She chose instead to incite serious violence against large numbers of persons. The applicant’s personal history could not significantly reduce her culpability for that serious offence. The court did not accept the Recorder gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors he rightly identified. The significance of the other communications
The applicant had pleaded guilty on 2 September 2024 to an offence of inciting racial hatred contrary to section 19(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. On 31 October 2024 the Recorder of Birmingham, HH Judge Inman KC, sentenced her to 31 months’ imprisonment.
On 29 July 2024, the day of the Southport stabbings in which three children were murdered, Ms Connolly, a childminder then aged 41 with approximately 9,000 followers on X (formerly Twitter), posted a message at 8.30 pm stating “Mass deportation now. Set fire to all the fucking hotels full of the bastards for all I care. While you’re at it, take the treacherous government and politicians with them. I feel physically sick knowing what these families will now have to endure. If that makes me racist, so be it.” The post was viewed 310,000 times and reposted 940 times before being removed by the applicant some three and a half hours later. Investigations revealed other messages indicating hostile views about illegal immigrants, including a post on 25 July responding to video shared by Tommy Robinson of a black male being tackled to the ground, saying “Somalian, I guess. Loads of them” with a vomiting emoji, and a post on 3 August responding to an anti-racism protest suggesting protesters should “sign a waiver to say they don’t mind if it’s one of their family that gets attacked, butchered, raped etc, by unvetted criminals”. WhatsApp messages on 5 August showed Ms Connolly was aware of the backlash, saying she would claim she had been the victim of doxing and would “play the mental health card” if arrested. She published a drafted apology on X on 6 August, later telling others she had done so for her husband’s sake. In interview under caution she admitted posting the tweet, saying her own child had died in horrendous circumstances and the Southport stabbings had put her into a rage, but claimed she felt hatred about the incident and circumstances, not about race.
The prosecution from the outset made clear that the case was brought under section 19(1)(a) on the basis that the applicant had acted with intent to stir up racial hatred. The offence may be committed either with such intent or, without such intent, where racial hatred is likely to be stirred up. At the Crown Court on 2 September 2024 Ms Connolly pleaded guilty without putting forward any basis of plea and did not challenge the prosecution’s categorisation of the offence. The prosecution submitted culpability fell into category A (high culpability) because the case involved “intention to incite serious violence” and harm fell into category 1 because she had published a message which “directly encourages activity which threatens or endangers life”. For a category A1 offence the Sentencing Council guideline indicated a starting point of three years’ custody with a range of two to six years. The prosecution further submitted that the timing, during a particularly sensitive social climate, was an aggravating factor. Widespread disorder, violence and criminal damage had erupted in multiple locations across the country from 30 July onwards, beginning in Southport and spreading to Manchester, Hartlepool, Aldershot, London, Sunderland, Liverpool, Belfast, Nottingham, Hull, Rotherham, Middlesbrough, Birmingham, Plymouth and Darlington over the following days. A pre-sentence report recorded that in 2011 the applicant’s son, then 19 months old, had died in circumstances giving rise to complaints of negligence against medical practitioners and that she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. The author noted the applicant had denied her tweet had racist undertones or could incite hatred or violence and had downplayed her behaviour. A psychiatric report from 2012 diagnosed a severe bereavement reaction classified as a form of adjustment disorder with persisting symptoms. The defence, represented at sentence by Mr Liam Muir, did not dispute the categorisation but submitted in mitigation the absence of previous convictions, positive good character, some remorse, the impact on her 12‑year‑old daughter, the personal mitigation relating to her son’s death, and that she faced a first custodial sentence in difficult prison conditions. Mr Muir also submitted that messages on 31 July showed that “whatever Ms Connolly’s intent … was on posting the offending post, that intention was short lived and she did not expect or intend the significant violence to follow in that she very quickly tried to quell it.”
The Recorder accepted culpability was in category A and harm in category 1, noting also that the applicant had sought and achieved widespread dissemination of her message. He found a significant aggravating factor in the timing of the publication during a particularly sensitive social climate, stating it would be difficult to think of a more sensitive time than during the evening of 29 July that year. A significant increase above the starting point was therefore required. The Recorder took into account the absence of previous convictions, the character references, the effect on the applicant’s daughter and the fact she would be serving a first custodial sentence in the present prison conditions. He accepted that although the tweet had been widely read she had not repeated any such statement, had in due course taken it down, and had sent some messages to the effect that violence was not the answer. Regarding the death of her son, the Recorder noted there was no recent psychiatric evidence and while she may have understood the grief of those who suffered their own tragic losses in Southport, she did not send a message of understanding and comfort but rather an incitement to hatred. There was no evidence of any mental disorder having any material effect on her committing the offence. The Recorder found it clear from the evidence of her own words in the days following her actions, what she said to the police and what she said to the probation officer that she had little insight into or acceptance of her actions. Balancing all factors, the Recorder concluded the appropriate sentence before reduction for guilty plea would have been three years six months’ imprisonment. Reducing that by 25 per cent to reflect the guilty plea which had not been indicated at the first opportunity, he imposed the sentence of 31 months.
On appeal, Mr Adam King submitted the sentence was manifestly excessive, first because the Recorder miscategorised the offence and should have assessed culpability as falling into category B (medium culpability) since the applicant was prepared to accept she intended to stir up racial hatred but had always denied intending to incite serious violence, and secondly because the mitigating factors significantly outweighed the aggravating factors, warranting a reduction below the guideline starting point and consideration of a suspended sentence. Mr King argued it was clear from the words of the tweet that it was “angry hyperbole” and could not be regarded as an incitement to serious violence. He also contended the Recorder overstated the aggravating feature and dealt only briefly and unenthusiastically with factors amounting to very significant mitigation. As an essential part of his argument, Mr King submitted the applicant had never understood that it was being conceded on her behalf that she had intended to incite serious violence and would never have admitted to having such an intention. This raised an issue as to the advice given by Mr Muir. The applicant waived privilege and both she and Mr Muir gave oral evidence to the Court of Appeal.
Ms Connolly gave evidence that when she heard the news from Southport she felt really angry, upset and distraught because children were dead and she knew how the parents felt. Before she posted her tweet the false information on social media that the murderer was an illegal immigrant had had an impact on her. But she did not intend anyone to set fire to migrant hotels or murder politicians. She later calmed down and deleted the tweet because she knew it was not an acceptable thing to say. In cross‑examination she said she was “just angry” when she posted the tweet and described the reference to burning hotels as “just a flippant remark”. Her evidence was that Mr Muir had never shown her the sentencing guideline or explained it to her and there was no discussion of whether she intended to incite serious violence. She accepted that on 12 August 2024 she had signed a document written by Mr Muir (referred to as “the endorsement”) which stated “I Lucy Connolly confirm that I do not wish to enter a basis of plea and I understand that this means I am conceding that at the point I published the tweet I intended to incite as per the category 1 feature. I do this as I do not believe I will be successful at a Newton hearing and I do not want to risk my credit. This is my decision under no pressure from anyone else. I know therefore that this would be a category 1A offence with a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment.” She said she did not know what category A1 meant and it was not explained to her. She accepted Mr Muir had gone through his sentencing note with her and she was content with it, but maintained she did not know the prosecution were alleging she intended to incite serious violence and did not understand she was accepting such an intent.
Mr Muir gave evidence that he spoke to the applicant for about 30 to 40 minutes on 12 August 2024 before the hearing and explained the options open to her, including pleading guilty and putting forward a basis of her plea. He explained the prosecution alleged culpability A and there would be a Newton hearing if she pleaded guilty but denied having the alleged intent. He further explained that if she was admitting she intended to stir up racial hatred she might have difficulty explaining how, despite using the words she did, she did not intend to incite serious violence. He also told her an unsuccessful Newton hearing could result in reduced credit for her guilty plea. His evidence was that he had shown the sentencing guideline to the applicant on his laptop screen and told her it would be possible to argue that the intent was short‑lived so the judge may be persuaded to move down from the starting point of three years. He wanted to be sure she understood the ramifications of the guideline because she would be making a concession about its application. After explaining all the options he invited the applicant to sign the endorsement and she did so. Mr Muir gave evidence that at further conferences, including immediately before the hearing on 2 September 2024, he discussed the guideline with her and confirmed she still wished to plead guilty and not to advance any basis of plea. He said he showed her the sentencing notes, as he always did with his clients, both because it was the right thing to do and because the client would hear about those notes in court. He denied the allegation that he had never shown the sentencing guideline to the applicant, repeating that he had shown it to her on each occasion. He added that the applicant was an intelligent woman who did not trust the prosecution and that she would not have signed the endorsement if she did not know what was meant by the reference to category 1A.
Lord Justice Holroyde, giving the judgment of the court, rejected Mr King’s argument that a close textual analysis of the offending tweet led to the conclusion that it was no more than an expression of emotion which could not be taken seriously. The words of the tweet were on their face an incitement to serious violence. It was unsurprising that the prosecution made clear throughout that they viewed the offence as involving category A culpability and unsurprising that Mr Muir advised the applicant about the strength of the prosecution case on that issue and warned her she would likely find it difficult to admit an intention to stir up racial hatred but to deny that the words she had chosen to use were intended to incite serious violence. The applicant had willingly pleaded guilty some four weeks after her first arrest, had not put forward any basis of her plea, and had expressly refrained from any challenge to the categorisation suggested by the prosecution. The plain meaning of the words and the clarity with which the parties had prepared their sentencing notes and made their oral submissions made it impossible to argue that the Recorder should have placed the offence into a lower category of culpability. By section 60(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020 it was the Recorder’s duty to decide which of the categories in the guideline most resembled the applicant’s case in order to identify the sentencing starting point. The Recorder was entitled and indeed obviously correct to categorise the case as he did.
The court considered with care the oral evidence and accepted the evidence of Mr Muir. He struck the court as a conscientious defence lawyer with a clear grasp of the relevant law, practice and procedure and a realistic appraisal of the issues in the case. His response to Mr King’s surprising suggestion that he might in some way have bypassed the obligation to give written notice of an intended basis of plea was telling. His evidence made it clear he had followed his usual practice and the court rejected the suggestion he gave this client no advice at all on matters of central importance. No reason was suggested why he might have adopted such an approach and the contemporaneous records he made supported his evidence. The court regretted to say it found the evidence of the applicant about these important matters incredible. Her evidence to the court showed her to be intelligent and articulate with strong views. Given her personal circumstances at the time of her arrest and her understandable concern for her daughter, any reference to a prison sentence based on a starting point of three years must have caused her great anxiety. In those circumstances the court was quite unable to accept that she signed the endorsement without any understanding of its references to the culpability factor or the starting point or that her state of ignorance in that regard continued throughout further conferences with Mr Muir or that she entered her guilty plea with no understanding of what it entailed. Her acceptance that she read and was content with Mr Muir’s sentencing note, which included references to the sentencing guideline and to the aggravating feature specifically mentioned in the guideline, clearly showed she was well aware of what she was admitting. Ground 1 was therefore unarguable.
As to ground 2, the court held it was not suggested the Recorder failed to identify any relevant mitigating factor. It was primarily for a sentencing judge to weigh the various aggravating and mitigating factors and to reach a conclusion as to what, if any, upwards or downwards adjustment should be made to the appropriate guideline starting point. This court would not interfere merely because it felt that some judges might have reached a slightly different conclusion; an applicant must show the judge imposed a sentence which was outside the range properly open to him or her. The court had every sympathy with the applicant over the death of her son and could understand why she remained angry about the circumstances of his death, and could accept that the shocking events in Southport had an impact on her which went beyond that felt by many others. But as the Recorder rightly said, she did not post a message of support and sympathy to the victims of the Southport attack and the bereaved. Nor did she post a message of hostility confined to the perpetrator of the Southport attack. She chose instead to incite serious violence against large numbers of persons. The applicant’s personal history could not significantly reduce her culpability for that serious offence. The court did not accept the Recorder gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors he rightly identified. The significance of the other communications