London Borough of Southwark v Trevor Hadjimina [2026] EWHC 954 (KB)
Summary
Background to the beliefs (paras 22-30)
Hadjimina’s correspondence with Southwark Council and the Court is laced with classic Freeman tropes. He demanded to know whether enforcement was directed at “TREVOR HADJIMINA the all-cap legal fiction” or “trevor hadjimina lower case the living breathing man”. He purported to “revoke consent”, denied any contract with the Council, called Southwark a “third-party interloper”, and claimed the 2018 injunction was void for lacking a “wet ink signature” and court seal. He invoked the Coronation Oath Act 1688, Bill of Rights 1689, Magna Carta and a “Clearfield doctrine” said to have dissolved all courts in 2008.
The judge’s framing of Freeman of the Land (paras 32-33)
HHJ Saunders describes it as a “pseudo-legal belief system claiming that individuals are sovereign and only bound by contracts they explicitly sign and/or laws the[y] expressly content to”. He picks out the standard distinction between the “living breathing man” and a “legal fiction” supposedly created by the State at birth and signalled by capital letters. He notes the use of “what look like legal phrases/maxims, but which are either meaningless or used out of their proper context”, typically wrapped in long documents lifted from internet sources.
His conclusion is blunt: in over 20 years on the Bench he has never seen these arguments succeed in any claim in any commonwealth jurisdiction. Adopting them is “to bury one[‘]s head in the sand in the face of litigation”.
Disruption at the 6 March 2026 hearing (paras 35-41)
Hadjimina fired questions, talked over the judge, refused to let him finish a sentence and at one point declared he was “the highest power in the Court” because the judge had “abandoned ship” by briefly rising. After warnings, the judge ordered him removed by the tipstaff and continued in his absence. The judge sets out the legal foundation for that step: Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114, Jesus Aquarius [1974] 59 Cr.App.R. 65, section 118 of the County Courts Act 1984, and Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt at 10-112, all confirming the Court’s power to remove a person who wilfully disrupts proceedings.
The “affidavit of Truth” arguments (paras 44-51)
At the 19 March hearing the judge worked through Hadjimina ‘s specific points and rejected each:
The “ten maxims of commercial law” (a workman is worthy of his hire, sacrifice is a measure of credibility, etc.) had no relevance and unknown provenance.
The claim that Southwark was a “third-party interloper” with no power to convert a right into a privilege was wrong: the Council acted under the statutory powers and duties in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Freeman idea that you can “opt out” of the Act is, in the judge’s words, “hopelessly misconceived” and “offensive to the rule of law and democracy”. All citizens are equal under and subject to the law.
The complaint that there was no “verified sworn claim” failed on the facts; service was good.
“There is no evidence of contract” was rejected because a citizen does not have to agree to be bound by the law.
The “Clearfield doctrine” said to have dissolved all courts in 2008 is “nonsense”.
The “wet ink signature” requirement is “plain wrong” with no foundation.
The maxim that “he who leaves the field of battle loses by default” has no application to legal cases. The judge had risen briefly for the tipstaff and never indicated the hearing had ended.
The complaint that due process was denied was rejected: Trevor had the chance to participate and chose to disrupt instead.
The planning permission dilemma (para 64)
The judge identifies the trap Hadjimina ‘s beliefs create. He has not applied for planning permission, and from his 26 March letter, will not, because doing so would mean engaging with a statute he claims he never consented to. But if he did apply, he would be accepting the Council’s authority. The judge calls this “yet another example of the severe difficulties engagement with these wholly misconceived beliefs can lead to”.
Sentence and the cost to Trevor (para 85)
The Freeman beliefs cost Hadjimina any meaningful mitigation. He has not admitted the contempt, apologised, shown remorse or attempted to remove the structure. He does not accept the legitimacy of the order and is presumed to see no reason to obey it.
The judge repeats the warning:
“this is the danger of the various Freeman of the land theories; they bring the Defendants into conflict with the rule of law. It is not a conflict that they will win and in the process they frequently, as with Trevor, act to their own very significant detriment.”
Hadjimina was sentenced to 6 months immediate custody (3 months concurrent for the wooden structure, 6 months for the brick structure), unsuspended.
Hadjimina’s correspondence with Southwark Council and the Court is laced with classic Freeman tropes. He demanded to know whether enforcement was directed at “TREVOR HADJIMINA the all-cap legal fiction” or “trevor hadjimina lower case the living breathing man”. He purported to “revoke consent”, denied any contract with the Council, called Southwark a “third-party interloper”, and claimed the 2018 injunction was void for lacking a “wet ink signature” and court seal. He invoked the Coronation Oath Act 1688, Bill of Rights 1689, Magna Carta and a “Clearfield doctrine” said to have dissolved all courts in 2008.
The judge’s framing of Freeman of the Land (paras 32-33)
HHJ Saunders describes it as a “pseudo-legal belief system claiming that individuals are sovereign and only bound by contracts they explicitly sign and/or laws the[y] expressly content to”. He picks out the standard distinction between the “living breathing man” and a “legal fiction” supposedly created by the State at birth and signalled by capital letters. He notes the use of “what look like legal phrases/maxims, but which are either meaningless or used out of their proper context”, typically wrapped in long documents lifted from internet sources.
His conclusion is blunt: in over 20 years on the Bench he has never seen these arguments succeed in any claim in any commonwealth jurisdiction. Adopting them is “to bury one[‘]s head in the sand in the face of litigation”.
Disruption at the 6 March 2026 hearing (paras 35-41)
Hadjimina fired questions, talked over the judge, refused to let him finish a sentence and at one point declared he was “the highest power in the Court” because the judge had “abandoned ship” by briefly rising. After warnings, the judge ordered him removed by the tipstaff and continued in his absence. The judge sets out the legal foundation for that step: Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114, Jesus Aquarius [1974] 59 Cr.App.R. 65, section 118 of the County Courts Act 1984, and Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt at 10-112, all confirming the Court’s power to remove a person who wilfully disrupts proceedings.
The “affidavit of Truth” arguments (paras 44-51)
At the 19 March hearing the judge worked through Hadjimina ‘s specific points and rejected each:
The “ten maxims of commercial law” (a workman is worthy of his hire, sacrifice is a measure of credibility, etc.) had no relevance and unknown provenance.
The claim that Southwark was a “third-party interloper” with no power to convert a right into a privilege was wrong: the Council acted under the statutory powers and duties in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Freeman idea that you can “opt out” of the Act is, in the judge’s words, “hopelessly misconceived” and “offensive to the rule of law and democracy”. All citizens are equal under and subject to the law.
The complaint that there was no “verified sworn claim” failed on the facts; service was good.
“There is no evidence of contract” was rejected because a citizen does not have to agree to be bound by the law.
The “Clearfield doctrine” said to have dissolved all courts in 2008 is “nonsense”.
The “wet ink signature” requirement is “plain wrong” with no foundation.
The maxim that “he who leaves the field of battle loses by default” has no application to legal cases. The judge had risen briefly for the tipstaff and never indicated the hearing had ended.
The complaint that due process was denied was rejected: Trevor had the chance to participate and chose to disrupt instead.
The planning permission dilemma (para 64)
The judge identifies the trap Hadjimina ‘s beliefs create. He has not applied for planning permission, and from his 26 March letter, will not, because doing so would mean engaging with a statute he claims he never consented to. But if he did apply, he would be accepting the Council’s authority. The judge calls this “yet another example of the severe difficulties engagement with these wholly misconceived beliefs can lead to”.
Sentence and the cost to Trevor (para 85)
The Freeman beliefs cost Hadjimina any meaningful mitigation. He has not admitted the contempt, apologised, shown remorse or attempted to remove the structure. He does not accept the legitimacy of the order and is presumed to see no reason to obey it.
The judge repeats the warning:
“this is the danger of the various Freeman of the land theories; they bring the Defendants into conflict with the rule of law. It is not a conflict that they will win and in the process they frequently, as with Trevor, act to their own very significant detriment.”
Hadjimina was sentenced to 6 months immediate custody (3 months concurrent for the wooden structure, 6 months for the brick structure), unsuspended.