Birmingham City Council v Sharif [2019] EWHC 1268 (QB)

An injunction was granted against persons unknown to tackle the problem of car cruising in Birmingham, service was effected by notices in newspapers, online and in prominent positions throughout the city.
Sharif was alleged to have breached the injunction and was served a committal notice. He sought to have the injunction discharged on the basis that it was wrong to have granted it and/or there was an error of principle in the reasoning which led to its grant.

The respondent relied on the decision in Birmingham City Council v Shafi [2009] 1 WLR 1961 where the Court concluded that where a local authority sought an injunction on terms that were identical to the terms that could have been sought on an application for an ASBO the Court would not, as a matter of discretion, grant an injunction save in exceptional circumstances. The argument was that Parliament had provided a remedy in the form of a Public Spaces Protection Order (PSPO) to combat the behaviour so only in very rare circumstances would it be appropriate for the Court to grant injunctive relief.

In support of the argument it was submitted that the sanctions for breaching the injunction under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 were far more onerous than the sanctions provided for in respect of breaches of PSPOs.

Held: reliance on the decision in Shafi was entirely misplaced, the choice here was not between two different types of court orders but between a remedy which requires a judicial decision and a PSPO which the local authority makes for itself. Moreover, Shafi has not been followed in other cases, notably Swindon Borough Council v Redpath [2009] EWCA Civ 943 and Birmingham City Council v James [2013] EWCA Civ 552. It is “clear from those cases that there has never been a doctrine requiring an authority to apply for the remedy representing the closest fit to the mischief aimed at”. “There is no general principle that only in exceptional circumstances should a Court grant an injunction where an alternative, specific statutory remedy is available or the Court should not do so where breach can carry more severe sanctions than breach of a PSPO, nor is there any basis for the argument that local authorities cannot seek a remedy with more serious consequences in the event of a breach or that the Court cannot grant such a remedy if it considers it justified and proportionate to do so.”