A [2019] EWCA Crim 106; [2019] 4 W.L.R. 45, CA.

Three main issues were identified in this appeal, namely:

1. The need for practitioners who appear before the courts, particularly prosecutors, to give accurate assistance to judges in relation to sentencing issues.
2. The extent, if at all, to which time spent on remand in local authority accommodation under s91 of LASPO can be taken into account when passing sentence.
3. If it can be taken into account, what the appropriate mechanism is by which to achieve any consequent reduction.

A pleaded guilty to manslaughter, he had been remanded for 8 days under s91(4) to HMYOI Wetherby and for 192 days under s91(3) to local authority accommodation, where he was also subject to an electronically monitored curfew under ss93 & 94.

At the sentencing hearing the judge’s attention was not drawn to the two types of remand, nor the curfew, although he had repeatedly sought the help of the parties as to whether account should be taken of the time rather than there being a reduction of specific days. He was informed by both parties that all the time on remand would automatically be credited. By the time the defence were told that only the 8 days at the HMYOI could be credited it was too late to seek reconsideration of the sentence under the slip rule.

The appeal was therefore put on the basis the judge had been misled into passing a sentence which was not adjusted to take account of the time on remand to local authority accommodation. Or, alternatively, that had he been aware that the days would not be automatically adjusted he would have taken account of the time subject to electronically monitored curfew.

Held: a period of time on remand in local authority accommodation cannot be the subject of automatic credit. There may be cases in which the interests of justice require that the length of the remand combined with the restrictive nature of the conditions ought to be reflected, beyond any credit for qualifying curfew, although such occasions are likely to be rare. The amount, if any, of such credit will depend on the facts of the particular case, it will not be a purely mathematical exercise. In this case the interests of justice did not require further credit beyond 96 days for the time on the curfew. The only way such credit can be awarded is for it to be included in the calculation of sentence. The sentence of 5 years was quashed and substituted with one of 4 years 269 days detention under s91, the appellant will continue to receive automatic credit for the 8 days on remand under s91(4).