Luke Martin [2019] EWCA Crim 1564
- Summary
- Citing
- Cited By
R v Luke Martin [2019] EWCA Crim 1564 concerned a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction for two offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, which the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Leggatt, Mr Justice William Davis and His Honour Judge Michael Chambers QC) refused.
Mr Martin, who was nineteen years old at the time of his conviction, was convicted on 18 May 2018 at Woolwich Crown Court and sentenced by His Honour Judge Shorrock to four years’ detention in a young offender institution. The single judge had refused leave to appeal on the papers, but counsel renewed the application orally before the full court.
The offences occurred just after midnight on 19 March 2017 in a park where a group of five young people had been chatting after spending the evening in a pub. Several young men, some of whom were clearly drunk, climbed over the railings and began behaving aggressively towards them without apparent reason. Callum Augustine, the first victim, attempted to defuse the situation but was set upon by a group of four or five males. He was knocked over repeatedly, punched and kicked to the head and chest, sustaining damage to his teeth and a broken rib. On the final occasion when he managed to stand up, he was struck on the back of the head with what he believed to be an iron bar and was hit almost simultaneously on the side of his head. Connor Langridge, the second victim, went to his friend’s assistance and tried to pull the attackers away. He was then subjected to punches and kicks to the head and legs, and someone struck him on the forehead with a bottle. He recalled one blow with the bottle, perhaps two, and then took several more hits before the group backed off. At that stage he was threatened with a knife. The police then arrived and both complainants were taken to hospital. Mr Augustine sustained two cuts to the head requiring stitches, bumps and bruises to the head and a small cut to his finger. Mr Langridge sustained a cut on the side of his head which also required stitches.
The prosecution case was that the applicant participated with others in jointly attacking the two complainants. A witness, Rhiana Hill, gave evidence that all members of the group were involved in the attack. The case against the applicant rested on several matters: his mobile phone was found at the scene with his DNA on it, he lived adjacent to the park, and Mr Langridge positively identified him in a formal identification procedure at the police station as the person who hit him with the bottle. Mr Langridge gave evidence at trial that the person he identified was the person who had struck him with the bottle causing the wound requiring stitches, and that he had also seen that person punching Mr Augustine. The applicant’s defence was that he had been so drunk that evening that he could not recall anything after about six o’clock and had passed out in his flat. He maintained that he was in his flat and not present during the attack. He contended that if he had been present, he was too drunk to have taken part, and he explained the presence of his mobile phone at the scene on the basis that it must have been stolen by one of the people who visited his flat that evening.
Six grounds of appeal were originally advanced, but counsel, Miss Chloe Gardner, confined her oral submissions to the first ground, namely that the judge erred in refusing to exercise the discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude the identification evidence. On the first day of trial, the defence applied to exclude the evidence of the video identification procedure on the basis that there was reason to believe the identification was not the result of Mr Langridge’s unaided recollection and may have been affected by communications he had had with someone who knew the applicant during the period between the assault in March 2017 and the identification procedure in July 2017. What had occurred was that Mr Langridge’s mother posted a picture of her son on Facebook with details of the assault. This led to contact from someone referred to as Adele. Mr Langridge then communicated with Adele and they exchanged descriptions, Adele describing the applicant who lived next door to her, and Mr Langridge describing the people who had assaulted him. Mr Langridge visited Adele’s home to discuss the descriptions further and subsequently drove past the address on several occasions keeping an eye out for the assailant, though he did not on those occasions see anyone he recognised. Adele had told the police that she had numerous problems with the people who lived at the applicant’s address, and it was suggested by the defence that she may have had a bias against him. In those circumstances, the defence argued that the identification evidence was tainted and that its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.
The trial judge rejected the application to exclude the evidence. Lord Justice Leggatt, giving the judgment of the court, held that the trial judge was clearly right and certainly entitled to do so. The court considered that the communications between Mr Langridge and Adele raised a question about whether it was possible to be confident that the identification made by Mr Langridge was accurate and reliable, but that this was a question which could be and was explored at the trial and which the jury could decide. The court saw no reason to suppose that a jury, provided that they were given proper directions about the nature of identification evidence and any potential weakness in the particular evidence given at the trial, could not consider this question fairly along with all the other factual issues in the case. It was plain from the judge’s summing-up that he had given a full Turnbull direction to the jury in which he identified the potential weaknesses in the identification evidence.
The other grounds of appeal were not pursued orally and the court noted that they were not reasonably arguable for the reasons given by the single judge. In short, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had been entitled to admit the identification evidence and that a properly directed jury could fairly assess its reliability, and accordingly refused the application for leave to appeal.